Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery by Repa, Jessica Lynn
American University Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 1 Article 5
2004
Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary
Business: Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake
Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic
Discovery
Jessica Lynn Repa
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Repa, Jessica Lynn. "Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles
Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery." American University Law Review 54, no.1 (2004): 257-303.
Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the
Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During
Electronic Discovery
This comment is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol54/iss1/5
REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/1/2005 10:47:18 AM 
 
257 
ADJUDICATING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF 
ORDINARY BUSINESS:  WHY THE 
INACCESSIBILITY TEST IN ZUBULAKE 
UNDULY STIFLES COST-SHIFTING DURING 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY  
JESSICA LYNN REPA* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction.........................................................................................258 
 I. Bearing the Burden of Costs in Electronic Discovery .............260 
 A. General Rules Regulating Electronic Discovery ...............261 
 B. Electronic Discovery is Distinct from Traditional 
Discovery .............................................................................266 
 C. Background of Cost-Shifting Jurisprudence .....................271 
 1. The difference between inaccessible and accessible 
data ................................................................................275 
 2. Uncertainty when data is not in usable form ..............277 
 3. Sampling inaccessible data predicts the costs of 
production.....................................................................278 
 D. The Tipping Factor:  Cost-Shifting During Electronic  
  Discovery .............................................................................280 
 1. Granting cost-shifting for unduly burdensome 
requests..........................................................................281 
 2. Denying cost-shifting in favor of broad discovery .......282 
 II. Comparative Analysis of the Undue Burden Test Versus 
the Inaccessibility Requirement ...............................................284 
 A. The Undue Burden Test ....................................................285 
 B. The Inaccessibility Test ......................................................287 
                                                          
      *    J.D. Candidate, May 2005, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., 
1996, University of Michigan.  I would like to thank Professor Robert G. Vaughn for his 
guidance and great sense of humor.  I also thank Raven M. Ducker for her tenacity 
and editorial assistance throughout the writing process and acknowledge Elizabeth 
A. Smith for inspiring the topic.  Finally, I thank my family for their love and 
encouragement. 
REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/1/2005  10:47:18 AM 
258 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:257 
 III. The New Rule from Zubulake Creates Incentives for Abuse....290 
 A. Bright Line Rule Considers Legitimacy of Discovery 
Requests in Narrow Cases...................................................291 
 B. Triggering Change:  Creating Local Rule Alternatives                        
and Modifying Business Behavior......................................291 
 C. Straining Resources and Inducing Settlement .................295 
 D. Updating Data Management Practices and Processes......297 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................302 
INTRODUCTION 
Electronic discovery presents unique problems during litigation.  It 
often involves a broad search of files by the opposing side and may 
impose a high risk to potentially privileged information due to the 
depth of information residing on computer systems.1  Additionally, 
the producing party cannot simply turn over the data as is, and often 
must create programming to retrieve discoverable information.2  The 
sheer volume and complexity of data involved with electronic 
discovery impose significant burdens on the producing party and 
present challenges to judges interpreting the impact of technology 
access requests.  Existing jurisprudence is unclear regarding when 
parties producing electronic data during discovery may shift the cost 
burden to the requesting party for the retrieval, production, and 
review of electronic evidence.3  The lack of clarity is exacerbated by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”), which offer 
minimal guidance regarding electronic discovery.4 
                                                          
 1. See Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence:  A New Dimension to 
Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 421 (1999) (deeming 
computer systems a potential gold mine for the discovering party and potential mine 
field for the producing party, as they may reveal damaging information and 
confidential material such as trade secrets, communications with counsel, and other 
privileged information). 
 2. See infra Part I.B (comparing the unique differences between electronic and 
traditional discovery). 
 3. Electronic evidence pertains to “electronically-stored information subject to 
pre-trial discovery.”  Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in 
Federal Civil Litigation:  Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 332-33 (2000) 
(suggesting “electronic document” refers to a type of electronic evidence 
“intentionally created by a computer user and stored in electronic form”); see, e.g., 
RICHARD A. LAZAR, THE GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:  HOW TO NAVIGATE THE 
PROCESS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY 1 (2002) (defining 
electronic discovery as the “collection, preparation, review[,] and distribution of 
electronic documents”); MICHAEL R. OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN 
CALIFORNIA § 1.01, at 2 (2002) (defining electronic evidence as “information stored 
in electronic form . . . that is relevant to the issues in a particular litigation”). 
 4. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 330 (observing that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure make only slight reference to electronic evidence and 
provide no guidance regarding the discovery of e-mail).  But see Robert F. Carangelo 
& Gina M. Graham, Passing the Buck:  Cost-Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 50 FED. LAW. 
35 (2003) (noting that electronic discovery is a regular part of discovery under the 
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This Comment explores the economic, political, and social impact 
of cost-shifting during electronic discovery5 by examining the 
decision in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.6  The conclusion suggests 
that Zubulake unduly limits judicial discretion during electronic 
discovery disputes, as the rule eliminates accessible data from the 
universe of information subject to a cost-shifting analysis.  The new 
threshold test articulated in Zubulake based on inaccessibility fails to 
consider the burden this limitation will have on forced settlements 
and unfair requests.  The corresponding result will require corporate 
counsel to craft document management practices and processes with 
an eye for expense reduction by making files easier to retrieve and 
discover during litigation. 
Part I provides background regarding the applicable rules 
regulating discovery, existing jurisprudence regarding electronic 
discovery disputes, and considers the type of factors that may trigger a 
cost shift to the requesting party.  Part II provides a comparative 
analysis of the undue burden test7 in the context of electronic 
                                                          
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Rules require the production of all 
documents, including electronic documents).  See also Mary Kay Brown & Paul D. 
Weiner, Digital Dangers:  A Primer On Electronic Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 30 LITIG. 
24, 25 (2003) (suggesting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evolve as technology 
changes and that electronic documents are subject to discovery according to Rule 
34). 
 5. See, e.g., Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery:  The Economic 
Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1386 (2000) (examining from an 
economic perspective the cost benefit analysis regarding the maintenance and 
improvement of information systems versus bearing the costs to retrieve); The New 
“New” Economy:  How Real and How Durable Are America’s Extraordinary Gains in 
Productivity?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2003, at 64 [hereinafter Productivity] (explaining 
that productivity improvements from information technology investment may boost 
efficiencies across the organization from design to accounting and across multiple 
sectors).  Additionally, implementing technology improvements for the purpose of 
making documents more accessible could reduce more than just litigation expenses.  
See discussion infra Part III.D.  In addition to economic utility, cost-shifting impacts 
the political system of the judiciary.  See Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic 
Analysis of Alternate Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 174 (1984) 
(suggesting that requiring the judiciary to determine what fees to shift and what fees 
are reasonable would be time consuming and burden judicial administration).  But 
see William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery 
Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1915 (2003) (suggesting 
that limiting the applicability of cost-shifting hinders the adversarial system of the 
judiciary since the limitation increases settlement incentives).  Finally, the social 
policy implications of cost-shifting in electronic discovery may come at the expense 
of civil justice.  See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 
718 (1967) (arguing that the poor should not be unjustly discouraged from 
vindicating their rights by having to incur penalties for defending or prosecuting an 
action).  A plaintiff unable to pay for the discovery of information may have better 
access to courts and a better ability to adjudicate where cost-shifting is limited.  Id. 
 6. 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (limiting cost-shifting during electronic 
discovery where data is relatively inaccessible). 
 7. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (noting that a court may protect a 
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discovery announced in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris 
Agency8 and the new Zubulake inaccessibility requirement.  This 
Comment suggests that the new Zubulake rule, hailing from the same 
court that issued Rowe, departs from the undue burden analysis and 
will likely have a compelling impact and guide other courts’ legal 
analyses.9  While the Zubulake court’s decision is not binding on the 
federal courts,10 other federal courts increasingly rely on Zubulake as a 
guide for determining cost allocation during electronic discovery.11  
Finally, Part III applies the new Zubulake test and suggests the impact 
the limitation will have on both corporate counsel and information 
technology departments.  Part III also provides recommendations 
regarding useful data management techniques to ultimately manage 
litigation costs. 
I. BEARING THE BURDEN OF COSTS IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
Electronic information is implicitly discoverable under the Federal 
Rules.12  The rationale for including electronic sources with 
traditional forms of documents is that the electronic files contain 
discoverable information in an evolved format.13  As a result, the same 
general rules that govern traditional discovery of documents also 
                                                          
responding party from “undue burden” or expense by shifting the costs of 
production to the requesting party). 
 8. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (permitting cost-shifting during electronic 
discovery based on an imbalance of burdens on the producing party to retrieve 
electronic files versus the benefits to the requesting party of obtaining the electronic 
data). 
 9. The Southern District of New York helps guide federal circuit decisions 
regarding electronic discovery disputes vis-à-vis cost-shifting.  See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (containing the test for 
determining burden that became the new gold standard for cost-shifting in 
electronic discovery disputes); see also Robert W. Hamilton, The State of State 
Corporation Law, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 3, 16 (1986) (finding that corporate law matters 
related to federal securities were predominately brought in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, suggesting expertise in complex corporate litigation). 
 10. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Erica J. Bachmann, Ripples on the Shores of 
Zubulake:  Practice Considerations from Recent Electronic Discovery Decisions, 50 FED. LAW. 
31, 33 (2003) (reminding counsel that Zubulake is not binding on federal courts 
other than the Southern District of New York and that some courts may find the 
accessibility standard too limiting). 
 11. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.  
 12. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (stating “[i]t 
is now axiomatic that electronically stored information is discoverable under Rule 34 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and denying the request to shift costs for the 
production of computer data). 
 13. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (noting that the description of documents is revised with 
changing technology and inherently includes electronic data compilations made 
clear by Rule 34). 
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govern electronic discovery.14  However, electronic evidence retains 
unique challenges and costs.15  Consequently, courts may follow 
different protocols when examining whether and when to shift the 
costs of electronic document production to the requesting party.16  
Nevertheless, courts remain steadfast to the traditional rules and 
typically adopt the presumption that each party should bear its own 
costs for discovery.17 
A. General Rules Regulating Electronic Discovery 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 34,18 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26,19 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 120  play a 
significant role during electronic discovery by offering guidance 
regarding how to allocate costs during litigation.  The interplay of 
these rules requires a balancing process to determine who bears the 
costs of electronic discovery when the facts suggest the burden of 
producing files outweighs the benefit.21 
In general, judicial discretion to control discovery is available to 
relieve congested dockets and avoid spiraling litigation costs.22  Judges 
have Rule 1 within their arsenal as a tool available to control litigation 
costs.23  However, as states began to adopt the Federal Rules and as 
courts interpreted the rules, the mandate for “just, speedy and 
inexpensive”24 adjudication under Rule 1 played less of a role since 
                                                          
 14. See infra Part I.A (describing the foundations of electronic discovery). 
 15. See infra Part I.B (outlining the differences between electronic and traditional 
discovery). 
 16. See infra Part I.B (discussing cost-shifting as a function of a court’s specific 
interpretation of the facts combined with the practicality of retrieving the 
information). 
 17. See infra Part I.C (summarizing the origins of cost-shifting and describing the 
courts’ struggles with finding an equitable solution). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.  
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 21. See Jonathan M. Redgrave, The Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic 
Document Retention and Production, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 197, 204 (2003) (balancing cost 
allocation by interpreting Rule 34 to encourage broad discovery of documents and 
things applied in light of the cost-benefit analysis discussed in FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26). 
 22. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2003) (noting that the Judicial Conference of the United 
States has the obligation to simplify, ensure fairness in administration, and eliminate 
unjust expense and inefficiency); FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee notes (1993) 
(adding the word “administered” to Rule 1 recognizes the affirmative duty of the 
courts to resolve civil litigation in a fair manner that avoids undue cost or delay). 
 23. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir. 
1993) (citing Rule 1 that empowers the court to control lengthy and arduous 
litigation and ultimately decide when “enough is enough”). 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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internal operating procedures often sacrificed the economies of 
uniformity.25 
Courts often cite to Rule 1 along with Rule 26 when discussing 
limitations during discovery.26  The scope of discovery is broad under 
the Federal Rules,27 and parties may obtain any relevant information 
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”28  Under Rule 26, litigants may find protection from 
annoying, embarrassing, oppressive, or unduly expensive discovery.29  
Courts may adhere to a totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether or not to restrict discovery.30 
When litigants use discovery tools as weapons rather than to expose 
the truth, this imposes significant costs on the judicial system and 
impedes justice.31  In general, however, judges are reluctant to limit 
the use of discovery since the material may serve a truth seeking 
function and any limitations may hinder the adversarial process.32 
In addition to the broad scope of discovery generally permitted 
under Rule 26, there are no boundaries on the number of 
documents that may be requested under Rule 34.33  By contrast, the 
Federal Rules impose limits on the number of interrogatories or 
depositions permitted under Rule 30.34  Similar to Rule 26, under 
                                                          
 25. See Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s 
Former Employees:  Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, 
and Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 917-18 (2003) (suggesting that the 
goal of efficiency and uniformity faded after states adopted the Federal Rules 
subsequent to Congressional promulgation of the Federal Rules). 
 26. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979); accord Jackson v. County of 
Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 658 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (using Rule 1 to limit the scope of 
discovery where there is undue expense); see also Reed v. Binder, 165 F.R.D. 424, 
428 (D.N.J. 1996) (indicating that Rule 1 requires cost-shifting where economic 
obstacles hinder plaintiffs from redressing rights and imposing limitation on 
discovery). 
 27. See Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating that 
discovery is broad and may even be expanded by the court to include additional 
sources not referred to by the party seeking discovery). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
 30. See Rowlin v. Alabama, 200 F.R.D. 459, 461 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (placing a limit 
on discovery after finding that, based on the “the totality of the circumstances,” the 
cost and time needed to provide the information outweighs the value of the material 
sought and societal interest).  Furthermore, the “truthseeking” function of the 
material requested in some cases may weigh in favor of permitting discovery.  Id. 
 31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1983) (explaining that 
abusive discovery practices resulting from the broad nature of discovery violates the 
spirit of the rules). 
 32. See id.; Apco Oil Co. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969) 
(noting the importance of maintaining an adversarial system and restraining 
discovery limits). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
 34. A comparative analysis of the amendment history of Rule 34 against Rule 30 
indicates that Rule 34 does not provide a limitation on the number of documents 
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Rule 34 litigants may defend against document discovery requests 
that are too general, cause undue burden, or contain ambiguous 
requests.35  Parties producing documents must also abide by the 
general rules of document discovery and engage in fair play by 
presenting documents for inspection in an organized manner.36 
With the advent of technology in the digital age, the existing rules 
may not address the unique problems inherent in electronic 
discovery.37  The Federal Rules include reference to electronic 
discovery.  Rule 34 expressly provides for electronic evidence to be 
included as discoverable material38 and the advisory committee notes 
suggest that the term “documents” evolves as technology changes.39  
Additionally, Rule 34(b) governs the particularity of the discovering 
party’s request, in part to avoid an overbroad request but also to 
ensure that a basis exists for finding relevant information.40  However, 
electronic discovery inevitably involves more information and 
exponentially increases the exposure to irrelevant information.41 
The complexity embedded within the electronic discovery process 
has led to a growing concern that the underlying scope of the Federal 
Rules in Rule 1, to ensure “just, speedy, and inexpensive” 
                                                          
permitted whereas Rule 30 includes new limits on the number of depositions 
permitted.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee notes (1993) (including a new 
limit on the number of depositions and citing purpose of limitation to encourage 
counsel to create a cost-effective discovery plan during adjudication). 
 35. See Stiller v. Arnold, 167 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (noting the 
prohibition of discovery requests used to harass or increase litigation costs). 
 36. See id. (placing an obligation on producing parties to “organize and label” 
documents or face the consequences of sanctions). 
 37. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (considering amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for issues specific to electronic discovery). 
 38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (stating that “[a]ny party may serve on any other 
party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone 
acting on the requestor’s behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents 
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other 
data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the 
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, 
test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the 
scope of Rule 26(b)”) (emphasis added). 
 39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee notes (1970) (noting the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate technological change and evolve accordingly as a 
robust set of procedural rules governing litigation). 
 40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (indicating, for the purpose of specificity and to avoid 
overbreadth, that “[t]he request shall set forth, either by individual item or by 
category, the items to be inspected, and describe each with reasonable 
particularity”).  But see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed:  The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998) (moving 
away from the belief that an overbroad request is burdensome, so long as there is a 
plausible basis to find relevant information and recognizing the liberal nature of 
discovery). 
 41. See Robins, supra note 1, at 421 (noting that historical data and multiple 
versions of the same file therein reside below the surface of electronic files, 
expanding the universe of discoverable data and increasing data vulnerability). 
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adjudication,42 is not being met because of the outrageous costs of 
electronic discovery retrieval and review.43  The advisory committee 
also recognizes that electronic storage expands the amount of 
information available for discovery and notes the potential that the 
abundance of data will have on increasing litigation costs.44  The 
complex and laborious process of culling information during 
electronic discovery costs time and money, which contradicts the goal 
of the Federal Rules to ensure efficient and inexpensive discovery.45 
Due to the inherent differences between electronic documents and 
traditional documents, the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin and Jeffrey 
Rabkin recommend changes to the Federal Rules to better address 
electronic discovery needs.  The recommended changes entail 
adding language to Rule 34 that would require data compilations to 
be within the “possession, custody, or control” of the producing party 
in order to avoid unnecessarily costly fishing expeditions for data.46  
In addition, Scheindlin and Rabkin suggest that courts require cost 
shifting for requests of duplicate hard-copy evidence and that the 
burden of persuasion should shift to the requesting party in order to 
shift costs back to the producing party for duplicate hard-copy 
evidence.47  In order to make changes to the rules, the rulemaking 
body in charge of the Federal Rules must adhere to a pseudo-
legislative process that makes amending the Rules more difficult than 
the general legislative process.48 
                                                          
 42. See Carol McKay, Delays in Litigation Costly All Around, 48 FED. LAW. 16, 16 
(2001) (noting that Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) to “facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases 
on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, 
speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes” as required by Rule 1). 
 43. See Stephen J. Snyder & Abigail E. Crouse, Applying Rule 1 In the Information 
Age, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 165, 165 (2003) (positing that electronic discovery may negate 
the underlying goal of fast and inexpensive adjudication). 
 44. See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Minutes, Apr. 19-20, 1999, 1999 WL 1702844, at *29 (citing Judge 
Niemeyer’s statements about how electronic discovery greatly expands costs because 
of the increased universe of information available for discovery and that the advisory 
committee cannot count itself as free from these discovery issues). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 374 (arguing that amending Rule 
34(a) to require “possession, custody or control” would reduce judicial intervention 
during discovery and thus streamline litigation by eliminating mini-trials about 
discovery disputes outside the province of the producing party). 
 47. See id. at 375 (justifying a cost shift back to the requesting party to pay for 
duplicate hard copies of electronic evidence by stating each party bears its own costs 
for preparation and that making duplicates where the discovering party requests the 
same evidence produced both electronically and in hard copy form should be 
considered preparation costs). 
 48. See R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRE-TRIAL LITIGATION:  LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 
206-07 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the steps for the enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the amendment procedure, including submission to the 
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In addition to Rule 34, Rule 26 also includes references to 
electronically discoverable information.  Disclosure requirements in 
Rule 26 include electronically discoverable information.49  The 
advisory committee notes make clear that relevant documents and 
records might include “computerized data and other electronically-
recorded information.”50  However, whether computer-created 
information such as temporary files, backup data, cookies, web cache, 
and history files51 are considered subject to discovery is uncertain.52 
Furthermore, Rule 26 contains limitations on discovery where 
there is an undue burden on the producing party.53  According to the 
proportionality test, a method of examining undue burden, where 
burden on the producing party outweighs the benefit to the 
discovering party, courts have the discretion to shift costs of 
                                                          
Supreme Court and the ability of Congress to create legislation to reject, modify, or 
defer the amendment).  While there is a general process to follow when suggesting 
and implementing a change to the Federal Rules, legislative history such as 
committee reports and hearings are not regularly available for amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, RULEMAKING PROCESS, 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEDURES:  PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS BY THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (on file 
with the American University Law Review) (describing where to find public 
information related to promulgation of new rules).  The public receives wide 
circulation of the proposed rules and may attend public hearings about proposed 
rules.  Id.  In addition, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
maintains records of meetings, reports, and correspondence from the advisory and 
standing committees.  Id. 
 49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (requiring a copy or description of all 
documents, data compilations, and tangible things during initial disclosure). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1993). 
See also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 347 (listing backup files, temporary 
files, cached files, cookies, and other information stored in electronic form as sui 
generis family of computer-created information). 
 51. Backup is defined as a copy or multiple copies of computer data on an 
external storage medium.  HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 89 (15th 
ed. 1999).  Such media include floppy disks, tapes, and compact discs.  Id. at 89, 156, 
317.  Backups are necessary because computers and networks can be unreliable, 
creating the possibility of loss of data.  Id. at 89.  A cookie is a means by which the 
server side of an Internet connection can store and retrieve information from the 
client side.  Id. at 208.  The advantage of cookies is that it allows easier and faster 
access to previously visited websites.  Id.  One disadvantage is that cookies may be 
placed on the user’s computer without the user’s knowledge, thereby raising privacy 
issues.  Id.  A cookie file is a file on the user’s hard drive where the cookie is stored.  
Id. at 209.  Cache, when referring to computer systems or networks, is most simply 
defined as information that is stored in anticipation of need, so that it can be 
presented more quickly than accessing the hard drive.  Id. at 130-31.  Web cache is a 
place on a user’s computer where graphics and text can be stored to reduce 
download time when the user desires to view them during subsequent visits to the 
site.  Id. at 131, 919. 
 52. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 347 (suggesting that the Federal 
Rules leave open the question of whether system data generated by a computer 
would be considered a discoverable document by itself). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
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production to the discovering party.54  The Federal Rules allow judges 
and advocates to use multiple rules as tools for allocating the costs of 
discovery.55  The 1970 advisory committee notes recommend invoking 
Rule 26(c) in order to limit discovery.56  However, in practice, courts 
also point to and rely on Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) to limit discovery and 
shift costs, as Rule 26(b)(2) works in the same way as Rule 26(c) to 
limit discovery and to shift costs at the court’s discretion.57 
B. Electronic Discovery is Distinct from Traditional Discovery 
The Federal Rules govern electronic discovery in the same manner 
as traditional discovery of paper files.58  However, there are profound 
costs and burdens, as well as technological differences, associated 
with electronic discovery.59  The unyielding costs of retrieving and 
reviewing electronic data may increase the burden of discovery, even 
where data management practices enable access to electronic files.60  
                                                          
 54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (enabling the judge to shield discovery or shift 
costs to the requesting party in proportion to the burden imposed when the “burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). 
 55. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 204 (discussing court intervention techniques 
during electronic discovery requests). 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1970). 
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).  See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 
437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978) (pointing out that the test should be whether the expense is 
substantial rather than whether the burden is undue as under Rule 26(c)); Hickman 
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (recognizing that the process of discovery 
includes boundaries as part of fundamental fairness). 
 58. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (stating that 
black letter law indicates electronic evidence is discoverable); see also KENNETH J. 
WITHERS, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:  NATIONAL WORKSHOP FOR UNITED STATES 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES 2 (June 12, 2002), at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi08.pdf/$file/ 
ElecDi08.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) (suggesting that up 
to ninety-three percent of generated information is electronic, based on a 2000 ABA 
Litigation Section Survey). 
 59. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 
561, 580-81 (2001) (recognizing that technical differences present practical 
difficulties, immense costs, and socioeconomic effects unlike traditional discovery); 
Patricia Nieuwenhuizen, E-Mail:  The Smoking Gun of the Future as Paper-Based Data Go 
by the Wayside, Counsel Must be Prepared to Collect, Produce, and Review Electronic Evidence, 
GLASSER LEGALWORKS (2000), WL EDRMS-GLASS-CLE 291, 293 (noting that turning 
over electronic data in its native format may not be sufficient for the requesting party 
since problems with privileged information may add to the steps necessary for the 
requesting party to use the information); Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal 
Standards Regarding Electronic Discovery:  There are Vast Differences Between Discovery of 
Hard-Copy Documents and Those Stored Electronically, and the Difference Should be 
Recognized, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 206 (2001) (proposing that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure change to address the unique discovery needs of electronic files, 
including the added costs of search, retrieval, and translation of files into a usable 
format). 
 60. See Patrick J. Burke & Daniel M. Kummer, Controlling Discovery Costs, LEGAL 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 19-20 (considering the unyielding costs of electronic 
discovery in litigation); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-
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While it has been suggested that different rules should govern cost 
allocation with electronic discovery because of the increased burden 
to retrieve, sift through, and organize the information,61 the 
traditional rules of discovery still govern, as the rules consider 
electronic data simply as an evolved version of a paper document.62 
While the Civil Rules advisory committee discussed the uniqueness 
of electronic discovery and referred the matter to the discovery 
subcommittee, the treatment of electronic discovery vis-à-vis 
traditional documents remains the same.63  In the meantime, courts 
continue to struggle with how to deal with the unyielding costs of 
electronic discovery.64  Despite the view that electronic information is 
simply an evolved version of paper information, there are distinct 
differences between traditional and electronic discovery.  One of the 
main distinctions between electronic discovery and traditional 
                                                          
3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (estimating that to conduct 
digital discovery would cost $6.2 million and require six months to retrieve, produce, 
and present e-mail stored in backup databases). 
 61. See Redish, supra note 59, at 561 (espousing the conditional cost shift model 
that examined accessibility of data as part of the reasonableness analysis for cost-
shifting). 
 62. See Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 461; supra note 39 and accompanying text 
(maintaining that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to electronic data in the 
same way as with paper files, as the rules evolve as technology advances).  In the 
context of depositions, the Rules evolved to include the telephone as a means of 
recording information while conducting depositions.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory 
committee notes (1980) (authorizing, under Rule 29, the use of a telephone as a 
method for recording depositions).  Moreover, Rule 29 permits parties to take 
depositions in “any manner” so long as stipulated, and parties are encouraged to 
agree on the least expensive and least time-consuming methods of obtaining 
information.  FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee notes (1993). 
 63. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Minutes, at 23-28 (Oct. 14-15, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules 
/Minutes/1099mnCV.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(discussing electronic discovery as a topic of interest regarding cost-shifting but 
making no changes to the rules specific to electronic data).  But see Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes, at 34-37 
(Oct. 3-4, 2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC1002.pdf 
(on file with the American University Law Review) (hinting that electronic discovery 
may warrant amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if issues remain 
prevalent and unresolved); Carangelo & Graham, supra note 4, at 37 nn.20-21 (listing 
seven aspects to consider related to electronic discovery when the advisory 
committee next drafts amendments to the Federal Rules including:  wrapping 
electronic discovery issues into the Rule 26(f) conference; requiring disclosure of 
computer systems; redefining the term “document” as it relates to deleted data and 
backup data; specifying the form of production of electronic data such as whether 
additional software is needed; exploring the level of effort needed to produce 
electronic data; defining privileges as they relate to electronic data; and creating a 
safe harbor provision to better guide document retention practices). 
 64. See Carangelo & Graham, supra note 4, at 37 nn.20-21 (arguing that 
amendments should clarify how to deal effectively with the unique issues of 
electronic discovery, and until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure change to 
accommodate the complexity of electronic data, courts will continue to wrestle with 
how to manage costs). 
REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/1/2005  10:47:18 AM 
268 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:257 
discovery of documents is that the costs are typically much greater for 
electronic data production.65 
Additionally, there are cost saving methods available for paper 
documents that are not available for electronic documents.66  
Notably, in traditional document retrieval, the requesting party may 
search for pertinent information after the producing party retrieves 
the files rather than require the producing party to find the relevant 
information.67  This reduces the burden on the producing party by 
reducing the amount of time needed to sift through files by giving 
the requesting party the option of searching through the paper files.68 
By contrast, allowing the requesting party to review electronic files 
freely is not practicable.69  Unlike information culled from traditional 
discovery, data discovered electronically may require additional steps 
in order to put the information in a usable format.70  Moreover, the 
                                                          
 65. See id. at 35 nn.4-5 (suggesting that because of the large volume of e-mail 
generated at different subsidiary locations within a dispersed organization, electronic 
discovery imposes more costs than old-fashioned paper documents, particularly when 
large corporations are involved); see also Allman, supra note 59, at 206-07 (arguing 
that electronic records differ from traditional documents because of the sheer 
volume of data, multiple versions of documents, and practical problems associated 
with retrieval).  But see Carlton S. Chen et al., Managing Discovery in Large-Scale and 
Pattern Litigation, ACCA DOCKET, WL 21 NO. 9 ACCADKT 60, 72 (2003) (noting, 
during a study comparing the costs for an electronic search with a manual search 
done by paralegals who retrieved files through traditional paper-based discovery, that 
electronic discovery saves money in searches).  However, while the electronic search 
cost only four seconds in time compared with sixty-seven hours in time for the 
manual search, the electronic search required programmers to code, image, and set 
up a database which cost a total of $22,300 versus the manual search that cost $7,370.  
Id. 
 66. See Pulver, supra note 5, at 1386, 1407 (arguing that cost saving techniques 
such as handing over files for the requesting party to review are not available in 
electronic discovery since electronic discovery demands greater protection of 
documents). 
 67. See id. at 1386 (arguing that the cost-saving option in traditional discovery to 
have the requesting party search for pertinent information once records are made 
available from the producing party is no longer a viable technique during electronic 
discovery, because parties need programming expertise to search through another 
party’s database for relevant information). 
 68. See id. (suggesting time-saving techniques available during traditional 
discovery are not available during electronic discovery due to complex electronic 
data that often requires expertise outside the scope of opposing counsel). 
 69. See Robins, supra note 1, at 421 (finding electronic discovery increases the 
risk of exposure to privileged or confidential information); see also Rothman v. 
Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 455 (7th Cir. 1997) (prohibiting parties from turning 
over a mass of documents or deliberately mixing documents during discovery). 
 70. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 59, at 591 (explaining that preparation of 
electronic evidence requires special knowledge of computer technology to obtain 
and translate the data into a readable format); Lisa M. Arent et al., EDiscovery:  
Preserving, Requesting & Producing Electronic Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 134 n.8 (2002) (elaborating on constraints whereby electronic 
evidence is only usable on respondent’s devices and data requires special preparation 
in order to be read by the requesting party). 
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producing party may have to create additional software programs71 to 
access the information, or purchase software licenses for technology 
no longer in use.72  Further, the expertise required to navigate 
through the information systems is unlike sifting through paper files 
because the search and retrieval may require technical expertise and 
understanding of information technology infrastructure and 
document management policies.73 
Despite some of the disadvantages of computer-based discovery, 
searches from retrieved electronic files may save costs and increase 
the efficiency of discovery.74  By understanding how an opponent’s 
computer systems work, parties can leverage the technological 
advantage of expedited searches through databases.75  Computer-
based discovery may reduce litigation costs and delays by saving 
time.76  Furthermore, electronic discovery may reveal even more 
evidence than in traditional discovery, as computers assist litigants in 
the collection, manipulation, analysis, and transmission of truths 
otherwise lost or destroyed.77 
In addition to requiring additional steps to readily access files and 
demanding specialized knowledge of computer systems, electronic 
discovery may also increase exposure to confidential and irrelevant 
files.  Allowing access to a central file room containing business 
documents in hard copy form is not the same as enabling the adverse 
party to access central servers containing multiple electronic 
                                                          
 71. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 634, 636 
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (noting that extra programming was needed solely for litigation). 
 72. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 379 (illustrating that one company 
may use a different word processing program than the requesting party, and so the 
requesting party would require its own license to view the data generated by the 
producing party). 
 73. See Lesley Friedman Rosenthal, Electronic Discovery Can Unearth Treasure Trove 
of Information or Potential Land Mines, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32, 35 (2003) (noting new career 
opportunities for digital detective work because of the influx of deeply complex 
electronic evidence investigation). 
 74. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 364 (noting that there are practical 
distinctions between traditional and electronic discovery such as time saved through 
expedited searches). 
 75. See Jay E. Grenig, Electronic Discovery:  Making Your Opponent’s Computer a Vital 
Part of Your Legal Team, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 293, 324 (1997) (suggesting effective 
use of technology by understanding how opponents store and generate computer 
based information may afford efficiencies during electronic discovery). 
 76. See Kenneth J. Withers, Advanced Discovery Issues:  Discovery and Protection of 
Electronic Data, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, WL SG101 ALI-ABA 835, 849-50 (2002) 
(noting time savings during document discovery in electronic form through more 
organized searches, the improved ability to add electronic data directly to litigation 
support systems, and quick media conversion during electronic courtroom 
presentations). 
 77. Id. at 850. 
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systems.78  For example, the requesting party may not have the 
expertise necessary to search through or translate the electronic data, 
and the information contained in the electronic database may 
contain confidential information related to the opposing counsel’s 
litigation strategy.79  Adding to the complexity, additional layers of 
information may be available during electronic discovery, including 
multiple versions of documents within the same electronic document 
file.80  Further, a lengthy e-mail trail may involve hundreds of 
duplicates of the same electronic message sent to multiple recipients 
and could be included as files requested and required to be retrieved 
by the producing party.81 
Finally, the added cost of productivity loss from computer 
downtime during electronic discovery may have an impact on 
business processes unlike traditional discovery since retrieving 
electronic files may take away from the use of computer systems 
necessary for employees to do their work.82  Loss of the computer 
system for a significant amount of time may undermine a party’s 
business and cause substantial disruption.83  Additionally, employees 
                                                          
 78. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 348 (discussing the impracticability 
of providing direct access to computer data since privileged information such as 
trade secrets or proprietary data may be accessed during electronic discovery); see also 
Redish, supra note 59, at 591 (providing that direct access to data storage facilities is 
not a viable option during litigation because of the confidential nature of data 
storage locations and content).  But see Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 
1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that electronic files were still discoverable despite the 
proprietary nature of data containing embedded confidential information). 
 79. See Pulver, supra note 5, at 1415-16 (discussing the trepidation involved with 
translating computer-stored information into a format considered usable by the 
courts since the rules fail to specify what a “usable” form entails); see also Richard L. 
Marcus, Confronting the Future:  Coping with Discovery of Electronic Material, 64 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 264, 269 (2001) (suggesting that electronic discovery requires 
additional experts to analyze and access data not otherwise needed for hard-copy 
documents).  Accessing electronic data may be more revealing because e-mail 
communication often generates unguarded and spontaneous communication.  Id. 
 80. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 365 (revealing that “invisible” 
evidence may be embedded within a computer and not easily retrieved by an average 
computer user); see also Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital 
Era:  Considerations for Corporate Counsel, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, 13 (2003) 
(describing layers of electronic documents that include “metadata” such as creation 
date or modification date within the electronic file).  The “metadata” reveals the 
traits of a document and generates history within the document itself and may be 
subject to discovery.  Id. 
 81. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 370 n.167 (noting that “the text of e-
mail communications can be forwarded to multiple individuals along with additional 
comments” and that “a critical communication may be passed on to many users and 
stored on their computer as a data file”). 
 82. See Robins, supra note 1, at 440 (explaining the process of analyzing a 
computer system inevitably requires the use of the physical hard drive for a specific, 
but variable amount of time). 
 83. See Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (recognizing that turning over a hard drive 
to enable the requesting party to discover information relevant to the lawsuit disrupts 
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often include personal information on their computer systems, thus 
promoting additional resistance by employees against discovering 
their confidential files.84  Some employees feel that their individual 
privacy rights are infringed during discovery of electronic files stored 
on their computer systems.85 
C. Background of Cost-Shifting Jurisprudence 
Courts have struggled with how to address cost-shifting disputes 
during electronic discovery.  What began as a tight reign on cost-
shifting loosened after courts started to understand the complex and 
burdensome nature of electronic discovery requests.  One court, 
however, did not follow this trend and instead restricted cost-shifting 
to matters pertaining to inaccessible data rather than basing its 
decision on the particular facts and circumstances of the case.86 
In general, there is an overall presumption for the producing party 
to bear the burden of costs for all forms of discovery and for the 
responding party to comply with discovery requests.87  Each party 
bears its own costs for discovery, barring any legislative limits, undue 
burden, or excessive costs.88  In some cases, however, the judge 
managing electronic discovery may limit discovery where the request 
                                                          
business and may reveal confidential information related to the litigation). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Michael Marron, Discoverability of “Deleted” E-mail:  Time for a Closer 
Examination, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 895, 922 (2002) (discussing privacy concerns of 
individual employees as only one aspect of document production and explaining 
that in Rowe, the court rejected privacy concerns as a reason to stall or reduce 
production of e-mail messages).  Since the e-mail messages reside on resources 
belonging to the company, the personal nature of electronic files is irrelevant since 
the organization for which the employee works owns the electronic information.  See 
Bonnie C. Glassberg et al., Electronic Communication:  An Ounce of Policy is Worth a 
Pound of Cure, 39 BUS. HORIZONS 74, 79 (1996) (indicating that electronic mail 
belongs to the company and not the employee). 
 86. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
[hereinafter Zubulake I] (finding that the requesting party, Laura Zubulake, who 
sought to retrieve e-mail evidence from backup tapes in a gender discrimination 
lawsuit against her former employer, UBS Warburg LLC, may bear some of the costs 
of restoring inaccessible data). 
 87. See S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (10th Cir. 
1993) (discussing the presumption that the producing party must pay for the 
expense of discovery requests, but that the court may grant protection against 
“undue burden or expense” by shifting costs of discovery to the requesting party as a 
condition of discovery). 
 88. See Redish, supra note 59, at 612 (revealing that express legislative directives 
that protect a group of plaintiffs may require cost-shifting); see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. 
v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (elaborating on Rule 
26(c) whereby courts may protect parties from undue burden or expense by 
exercising discretion).  But see Braeutigam, supra note 5, at 173-74 (distinguishing the 
American rule, where each party bears the costs of its own litigation, and the English 
rule, where the losing party pays for the legal fees of both parties). 
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results in an undue burden, produces redundant data, contains 
irrelevant information, or infringes on privacy rights by accessing 
privileged files.89  Nevertheless, a majority of courts deny requests to 
shift costs because the need to obtain the discoverable information 
outweighs the burden on the producing party.90 
Initially, the courts did not typically permit cost-shifting during 
electronic discovery because the cost of doing business inevitably 
involved the production of electronic data as a natural progression of 
business operations.91  Courts, reluctant to sympathize with businesses 
that failed to take precautions necessary to manage risks, did not 
want to force opponents to pay for the faulty business practices and 
record keeping of the opposing party.92  Courts often found that the 
requesting party should not have to pay for the producing party’s 
poor choice of electronic storage and data management devices and 
techniques.93  As a result, the party responding to discovery requests 
often had to bear the costs of electronic discovery.94  For example, in 
Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States,95 the court considered the 
normal and reasonable translation of data into a usable form as part 
of an ordinary and foreseeable burden imposed on businesses.  Cases 
reveal that the effective management of technological resources 
                                                          
 89. See Jonathan M. Redgrave, The Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic 
Document Retention and Production, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 197, 198-99, 223 (2003) 
(imposing a “rule of reasonableness” for electronic discovery and suggesting a 
common sense approach for counsel to object to unreasonable discovery requests); 
see also Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, 2000 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, III.B.1-III.B.2 (2000) (suggesting the pre-trial conference as an 
important judicial management tool for tackling electronic discovery issues). 
 90. See Corinee L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age:  
Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
257, 267 (2000) (indicating that courts generally disfavor cost-shifting in instances 
where the producing party should have electronic data in a usable form as an 
ordinary and foreseeable cost of doing business); see also William W. Schwarzer, The 
Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 703 
(1989) (suggesting that the volume and complexity of cases necessitates judicial 
control of discovery to manage the scope and pace of litigation). 
 91. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (finding that the parties must 
produce backup tapes as a cost of doing business in the digital age). 
 92. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976) 
(finding that costly or time-consuming discovery should not halt production of 
documents where the material is relevant and necessary to discovery evidence). 
 93. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (holding the producing party 
responsible for retrieving electronically stored data at a cost approximated at $50,000 
to $70,000 as an expense of doing business). 
 94. See Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. at 76 (requiring discovery even though the retrieval 
was unduly and costly). 
 95. 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986). 
REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/1/2005  10:47:18 AM 
2004] ADJUDICATING BEYOND ORDINARY BUSINESS 273 
becomes a business imperative in light of judicial allowance of broad 
discovery. 
Courts later broadened the ability to shift costs back to the 
requesting party due to the unyielding costs inherent in electronic 
discovery retrieval, production, and review.96  The court in Rowe 
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency97 quickly set the standard 
for cost-shifting during electronic discovery by permitting broader 
application of the undue burden test.98  In Rowe, the court granted 
the responding party’s motion to compel discovery of back-up tapes 
and hard drives at the expense of the requesting party because the 
burden of retrieval outweighed the perceived benefit to the 
requesting party.99  The estimated cost shifted to the requesting party 
in Rowe was between $158,000 and $236,000.100  By allocating costs in 
proportion to benefit and need, the cost burden for electronic 
discovery shifted to the requesting party when there was an undue 
burden on the producing party.101 
Following Rowe, courts favoring cost-shifting often based their 
decision on the flexible eight-factor undue burden test announced in 
Rowe, which properly allocated the costs of electronic discovery on 
the benefits and burdens to the parties.102  The Rowe test examined 
the following eight factors to determine whether to shift costs:  the 
specificity of the request; the likelihood of discovering crucial 
information; the availability of such information from alternative 
sources; the purposes for maintaining requested data; the benefit to 
both parties; the costs of production; the ability and incentive for 
                                                          
 96. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 431-32 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (shifting cost of discovery to requesting party when retrieval and 
disclosure of information would otherwise prove too costly). 
 97. Id. at 421. 
 98. See Carangelo & Graham, supra note 4, at 35-36 (noting that, prior to 
Zubulake, multiple courts turned to the Rowe standard for guidance on the 
appropriate allocation of costs during electronic discovery production disputes); see 
also Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Discovery Seeking Inaccessible Material Can 
Result in Cost-Shifting, 26 NO. 11 EMPL. PRAC. UPDATE 2, 6 (2003) (discussing the 
proportionality test from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Rule 26(b)(2) that 
limits discovery in cases where the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit”). 
 99. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433. 
 100. See id. at 431 (indicating that the “magnitude of these expenses favors cost-
shifting”). 
 101. See id. at 433 (holding that plaintiffs shall bear the costs of production). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb, 205 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.N.J. 2002) 
(following the Rowe cost-shifting approach where requesting party bears costs of 
discovery); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3564, 2002 WL 
246439, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (noting that Rowe “provides sound guidance 
for resolution of these issues where the retrieval, production, and review of e-mail 
from backup tapes is at issue”). 
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each party to control costs; and the financial resources available to 
both parties.103  While Rowe permitted producing parties to shift costs 
to requesting parties for the retrieval of electronic information,104 the 
producing party had to allow the requesting party to either review e-
mails for responsiveness or bear the cost of assembling the files for 
responsiveness and identifying privileges.105 
However, the recent decision in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg106 limited 
cost-shifting to only extenuating circumstances by requiring the data 
to be inaccessible in order to shift the burden of costs to the 
requesting party.  This shift further increases the burden on the 
producing party.107  The new Zubulake test eliminates the “specificity” 
and “purposes” factors and replaces the Rowe test with a seven-factor 
test organized in order of importance rather than based on flexible 
factors.108  The court in Zubulake unveiled the new seven-factor test for 
shifting costs during discovery, the factors being:  the extent the 
request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information; the 
availability of information from other sources; the total cost of 
production compared to the amount in controversy; the total cost of 
production compared to the resources available to each party; the 
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and the benefits to 
the parties of obtaining the information.109  The Zubulake decision 
includes a three-step cost-shifting analysis that determines the 
threshold question of whether the electronic evidence is 
inaccessible.110  If the court considers the data inaccessible, the 
producing party may provide sample data to predict the costs of 
overall production.111  Finally, considering the Zubulake seven-factor 
                                                          
 103. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (describing the eight step 
Rowe test for determining undue burden by balancing the cost of production against 
the need for the information). 
 104. See id. (applying Rowe test where plaintiff had to bear costs of retrieving e-
mails from backup tapes). 
 105. Id. at *7. 
 106. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318 (imposing a threshold test where data 
must be in an inaccessible format in order to analyze whether or not production of 
documents imposes an undue burden). 
 107. See id. at 324 (indicating that courts should only consider cost-shifting in 
situations where electronic data is relatively inaccessible). 
 108. See id. at 321 (noting the elimination of the redundant Rowe factor of 
“specificity of the discovery request” and the “purposes for which the responding 
party maintains the requested data” since the business reason for storing the data 
does not impact accessibility). 
 109. Id. at 322. 
 110. Id. at 324. 
 111. Id. 
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test, the court weighs the benefit of the data against the burden for 
retrieving and producing data.112 
1. The difference between inaccessible and accessible data 
While limiting cost-shifting to situations where data is relatively 
inaccessible may provide a bright line rule, whether the data is 
indeed inaccessible is not so easily determined and must be 
considered based on the circumstances.113  In order to determine 
whether to shift costs under the Zubulake rule, the court must first 
examine the accessibility of the requested data.114  Accessible data can 
be retrieved with relative ease and resides in a readily identifiable 
location.115  By contrast, disaster recovery data on backup servers used 
for emergency purposes would likely be considered inaccessible.116  
The justification for treating inaccessible data differently is that the 
data has to be restored or manipulated in order to be usable.117 
One way to analyze accessibility turns on the method of storage.118  
In Zubulake, the court listed five categories of data based on storage 
method and included backup tapes, erased, fragmented, or damaged 
data as types of data likely to qualify as inaccessible.119  New forms of 
                                                          
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 323-24 (noting that a quandary exists whereby the courts must 
struggle with applying a rule of inaccessibility and a multi-factor test weighed in 
descending order).  The Zubulake test contains both a rigid rule of accessibility and 
flexible standards when dealing with cost-shifting.  Id.  An analogous approach in 
Civil Procedure uses a threshold test in a flexible manner in the context of class 
actions to determine whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction motion.  See 
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1251, 1280 (2002) (suggesting that the threshold test performs a gatekeeping 
function yet allows for adjustment based on the merits of the case before certifying a 
class); see also In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, No. MDL No. 
1428(SAS), 2004 WL 515534, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004) (applying a threshold 
test in the context of jurisdiction where a litigant must first establish minimum 
contacts in order to determine the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a 
defendant). 
 114. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
 115. See id. at 320 (categorizing data that is easily retrieved and usable without 
manipulation as accessible). 
 116. See id. (noting the more complex process for restoring backup data to a 
usable form); see also McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(explaining the random nature in which backup tapes collect and store 
information). 
 117. See Redish, supra note 59, at 584-85 (suggesting that the retrieval of data 
unknown to the user, such as temporary files, involves more effort and expense than 
searching for active data); see also Dort & Spatz, supra note 80, at 11 (showing that 
complex technology systems, including Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), cellular 
phones and pagers, and digital cameras, may be electronic devices subject to 
discovery and may require further expertise to retrieve data). 
 118. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319. 
 119. See id. at 319-20 (listing five categories of data including:  (1) active, online 
data; (2) near-line data; (3) offline storage/archives; (4) backup tapes; and (5) 
erased, fragmented, or damaged data).  As technology changes, it is likely that the 
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electronic evidence, however, such as cookies, temporary files, 
residual data and web caches120 may qualify as accessible even though 
these types of data are not easily found by the computer user and 
require additional retrieval steps.121  Notably, instant messaging (IM) 
might surpass e-mail as the number one business communication 
method in electronic form122 and could become the new treasure 
trove containing highly relevant information during discovery.  The 
impact that IM, as a communication medium, will have on companies 
could be substantial, particularly since employees lack awareness that 
instant messages remain on corporate systems and may be retrieved 
at a later date as evidence.123 
In addition, electronic evidence that must be retrieved and 
subsequently translated in order to be utilized may not pass the 
Zubulake inaccessibility test.124  The ability to access data implicitly 
includes the ability to use the data.  Furthermore, even if data is not 
accessible, where the lack of usability was due to inadequate business 
practices, the cost of doing business may include translating the data 
into usable form.125  The threshold test of inaccessibility may exclude 
inaccessible data that should have been accessible under ordinary 
business circumstances. 
                                                          
Zubulake rule will correspondingly change to examine retrieval and usability as 
categorization tools rather than limiting analysis to a specific storage method.  Id. 
 120. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 338-41 (positing conflicting types of 
technology that may not necessarily fall under the definition of accessible).  Data 
embedded within temporary files contains crucial information that tracks the history 
of the file, and this form of information will likely qualify as highly relevant and 
subject to discovery.  Id. at 337-38.  However, because of the special programming 
and skill required to retrieve the information, the courts may consider unique forms 
of technology inaccessible.  See infra Part I.D; infra note 157 (discussing cases that 
allowed cost-shifting where special programming requirements inhibited 
production). 
 121. See Redish, supra note 59, at 584-87 (describing how information 
automatically generated by the computer system and embedded within hidden files is 
not easily found by the computer user but may provide key facts necessary to win a 
case). 
 122. See Pike & Fischer, Inc., Instant Messages Emerging as Newest Source of E-evidence, 
3 DIGITAL DISCOVERY AND E-EVIDENCE 1 (2003), available at http://www.socha 
consulting.com/Publications/DDEE%2009.03.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (noting that analysts predict instant messaging will surpass e-
mail as the top electronic communication medium in business). 
 123. See id. at 2 (warning that remarks made while instant messaging become a 
part of the “corporate DNA” and can be used as evidence in a lawsuit).  Retrieving 
the electronic data created from instant messaging could be considered accessible 
yet the burden on producing parties to retrieve such files may be a question with 
which courts will have to wrestle.  Id. 
 124. See supra Part III.B (suggesting limitations on cost-shifting when discoverable 
information relates to the ordinary cost of doing business). 
 125. See Giacobbe, supra note 90, at 267 (explaining the court’s belief that cost of 
translating data into usable form should normally fall upon the requested party). 
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2. Uncertainty when data is not in usable form 
While discovering parties may be able to easily retrieve electronic 
data in raw form, thus failing to clear the hurdle of the inaccessibility 
test from Zubulake, they may be unable to interpret the data due to its 
unusable format.126  The extraordinary steps necessary to produce the 
data in a format usable by the requesting party may meet the undue 
burden test.  However, it may not trigger the cost-shifting analysis 
under Zubulake, as technically, the producing party is able to retrieve 
the data.  The producing party may be able to obtain the data but 
must take steps such as programming or licensing in order to use the 
data.127 
Courts have allowed cost-shifting where the producing party had to 
create “special programming” in order to access the information.  
The requesting party may bear the burden of paying for “special 
expenses” incurred by the responding party such as the creation of 
special programming or the licensing of software in order to review 
the data.128  In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.,129 the plaintiff paid 
discovery costs to extract data from files.  Another example of a 
discovery request for information outside of the scope of ordinary 
business and not readily usable occurred where the requesting party 
had to bear costs because the tape did not exist prior to the request.130  
                                                          
 126. See OpenTV v. Liberate Tech., 219 F.R.D. 474, 477 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(including the substantial time and expense needed to extract data and create data 
in usable form as factors that earmarked the electronic data as inaccessible under the 
court’s interpretation of the Zubulake inaccessibility test).  But see Kozlowski v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976) (noting that Sears was not allowed 
to frustrate discovery because of an inadequate filing system despite being costly and 
time-consuming). 
 127. The “get it” versus “use it” distinction may turn on whether companies should 
create the document in a usable form as a cost of doing business.  See infra Part I.D.1 
(examining how courts allocate costs during translation cases when documents are 
not available in English).  But see IRON MOUNTAIN, THE CIO CHALLENGE:  CHANGE 
DISRUPTIVE TRENDS INTO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 4-5 (2004), available at 
http://www.ironmountain. 
com/File_Uploads/Resource_Items/USA/598_0_Disruptive_Trends.pdf (on file 
with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter CIO CHALLENGE] 
(suggesting that when an electronic file resides on a backup tape for disaster 
recovery purposes, the business reason for keeping the data pertains to information 
technology use, not record retention use, hence requiring the file to be readable falls 
outside the scope of the business purpose for the data). 
 128. See ABA Section of Litigation, Civil Discovery Standards 29(b)(iii), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ lookup/ElecDi02.pdf/$file/ElecDi02.pdf (Aug. 
1999) (on file with the American University Law Review) (suggesting that the 
discovering party should pay “special expenses” incurred, such as creating 
supplemental software to retrieve the information or acquiring licenses in order to 
legally access the information). 
 129. No. 94 Civ. 2120(LMM)(AJP), 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996). 
 130. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 634, 636 
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (shifting costs of producing data in a special format for litigation 
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The court in In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport131 
contemplated whether the producing party should pay to create the 
requested data in a specific format even though the procedure 
required debugging and manually checking input for accuracy.132  
Since the data requested only fulfilled litigation purposes, the 
requesting party bore the costs instead of the producing party.133  
Consequently, if electronic data requires extra steps in order to open 
or interpret the information, the data is not usable and courts may 
consider the material inaccessible. 
3. Sampling inaccessible data predicts the costs of production 
In addition to applying the threshold test of inaccessibility, an 
important part of the Zubulake test involves sampling inaccessible 
data.  After determining whether or not the electronic data requested 
falls under the category of “inaccessible,” the next question to 
consider involves sampling the inaccessible data in order to 
determine the cost-benefit of shifting costs.134  The sampling test from 
McPeek v. Ashcroft135 discusses the attempt to balance the opposing 
interests of overbroad requests and the need for adherence to the 
general purpose of discovery rules, which is to enable broad discovery 
of information.136  McPeek revealed the competing policies of liberal 
discovery and the protection against discovery abuse, and the court 
created the sampling step for electronic discovery disputes as a way to 
solve the dilemma.137 
As a means of predicting costs during electronic discovery disputes, 
sampling electronic data benefits both parties by examining scope 
and ensuring relevancy.138  If there are multiple tapes to access, based 
on the economic analysis of producing the samples versus all of the 
evidence, the lower cost of production will likely be the test run.139  To 
                                                          
purposes to the requesting party). 
 131. Id. at 635. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 636. 
 134. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (suggesting that parties first sample the 
inaccessible data to better predict the overall costs of retrieval). 
 135. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 136. See id. at 34 (suggesting that the requesting party might, “like the Rolling 
Stones . . . hope that if they ask for what they want, they will get what they need”). 
 137. See id. (hoping that a sample of the requested material may yield relevant 
information and further resolve the competing issues). 
 138. See id. at 35 (ordering a test run of the database to determine cost, time, and 
responsiveness of sample e-mails searched and retrieved); see also Carangelo & 
Graham, supra note 4, at 36 (discussing the second prong of Zubulake test, the 
sampling step, which requires a factual showing that supports cost-shifting to the 
requesting party). 
 139. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (describing the benefit of sampling data in 
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make the most out of the sampling step explored in Zubulake, IT 
departments may want to estimate costs upfront for sampling of back-
up tapes to determine costs.140 
In some cases, the court may opt to skip the sampling step because 
of the obviousness of the corresponding costs of retrieval.  In OpenTV 
v. Liberate Technologies,141 the court found that the data requested 
conformed to the definition of inaccessible and did not require data 
sampling to determine whether or not to shift costs back to the 
requesting party.  Since the producing party, Liberate Technologies, 
provided the amount of time programmers needed to spend 
extracting the data to comply with the discovery request, the court 
had an approximation of the resources needed to extract the data.142  
The court deemed the electronic data inaccessible, analyzed the 
Zubulake factors, and shifted some of the costs based on both the 
benefit the data could provide to the requesting party and the 
corresponding neutral benefit but high cost to the producing party.143 
Overall, the Zubulake test minimizes the chances for a producing 
party to shift discovery costs back to the requesting party.144  While 
some costs shifted to the requesting party in Zubulake, the producing 
party, UBS Warburg, ultimately paid for the majority of the discovery 
costs.145  The new Zubulake test leaves open the possibility for a 
requesting party to elicit an overly broad request of electronic 
                                                          
order to better predict overall costs of retrieving electronic files). 
 140. See McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34 (premiering the testing step for electronic 
discovery as a practical option to forecast the burden of retrieval). 
 141. See 219 F.R.D. 474, 477 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that unduly 
burdensome time requirements and the potentially expensive process needed to 
make data available in a usable format qualified the discovery request as an 
inaccessible format for discovery purposes). 
 142. See id. (estimating that extracting source code would take between 125 and 
150 hours of work to complete the discovery request for OpenTV). 
 143. See id. at 478-79 (finding that both parties must share equally in the costs of 
extracting source code in order to convert it to accessible format given the relative 
resources of each party and the corresponding benefits). 
 144. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (indicating that responding party should pay 
for the costs of production for data kept in accessible formats and courts should only 
consider cost-shifting in cases where data is relatively inaccessible); see also Zubulake 
v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Zubulake II] 
(allowing cost-shifting to requesting party, Laura Zubulake, for twenty-five percent of 
costs associated with restoring backup servers but requiring producing party to pay 
for the review and production of data once it is accessible). 
 145. UBS Must Pay 75% Of Cost for E-mails, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2003, at C7.  See 
generally UBS Warburg Is Ordered To Pay, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2003, at C9 (announcing 
the initial outcome of Zubulake I case where court required the producing party to 
pay for review and production of e-mail from backup servers); Susanne Craig & Ann 
Davis, Judge Orders UBS to Pay to Retrieve E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at 10 
(highlighting the outcome of Zubulake II case after further analyzing data that 
ultimately shifted only twenty-five percent of costs to the requesting party, despite the 
inaccessible nature of the data). 
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information during discovery, so long as the data is accessible.146  As a 
result, cost-shifting occurs only in narrow cases.147  Courts may require 
companies to pay to make data accessible, even though the data does 
not have to be accessed in the regular course of business.148  
Therefore, understanding information systems will help companies 
predict potential exposure to broad requests.149 
Corporate counsel will need to anticipate litigation costs and 
prepare for potentially broad and burdensome electronic discovery 
requests.150  While judges may intervene to limit discovery abuse,151 the 
rules are discretionary and will not likely shield producing parties 
from excessive costs during discovery.  In practice, most judges will 
not halt discovery simply because of a broad discovery request.152  If 
the request relates to electronic discovery, courts typically require the 
producing party to produce electronic files in usable form.153 
D. The Tipping Factor:  Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery 
Courts often grapple with how to weigh factors during pre-trial 
discovery and limit costs where document requests cause undue 
burden on the producing party.  According to a survey conducted for 
the Federal Judiciary Center, one of the main problems of electronic 
discovery pertains to sharing costs for retrieving information.154  The 
                                                          
 146. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
 147. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 37 (noting Zubulake limits cost-shifting to 
instances where data is relatively inaccessible and does not apply the undue burden 
test where the data format is accessible). 
 148. See Merrick T. Rossein, Zublake Modification of Rowe:  Eliminating Two Factors, 
in 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:29:75 (2004) (noting that 
“it is accessibility, which is the core basis for calculating the cost of production, not 
whether the data is kept for a business purpose or another purpose”). 
 149. See Gene Klimov & Samuel H. Soloman, The Art of War, GLASSER LEGALWORKS, 
WL EDRMS-GLASS-CLE 62 (2002) (suggesting that companies prepare a working 
group designed to understand retention policies, know the risks and scope of the 
organization’s information, and implement audits as a way to better prepare for 
electronic discovery requests). 
 150. See Dort & Spatz, supra note 80, at 14-16 (analyzing Zubulake factors and 
providing practical tips to corporate counsel for managing risks and costs, such as 
sending a notice letter to opposing counsel to preserve potentially relevant data and 
creating document retention policies and procedures to ensure better organization 
of electronic files).  But see UBS Must Pay 75% Of Cost for E-mails, supra note 145 
(indicating that a spokesman for UBS stated, “We are pleased the judge has shifted a 
portion of the cost of e-mail restoration to the plaintiff.  Traditionally the full cost is 
placed on the producing party.”). 
 151. See Wagener, supra note 5, at 1897 (suggesting that the federal rules allow for 
cost-shifting of discovery costs for paper files). 
 152. See id. (arguing that judges are hesitant to deter discovery because of the 
difficulty of distinguishing between abusive discovery practices and legitimate 
discovery requests that could reveal relevant evidence). 
 153. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the usable format required for electronic files). 
 154. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., A Qualitative Study of Issues Raised by the 
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issues that give rise to cost-shifting disputes include hiring computer 
experts, accessing privileged information, managing the on-site 
inspection of computer systems, and facing preservation or spoliation 
issues.155  In the survey, the majority of cases involving electronic 
discovery issues included individual plaintiff employment disputes, 
general commercial litigation, and patent or copyright issues.156  
These matters may often involve cost-shifting. 
1. Granting cost-shifting for unduly burdensome requests 
Cost-shifting requests are not regularly granted, but where 
extraordinary steps are necessary to produce documents, the court 
may shift costs.  During discovery, courts may require parties to share 
expert costs and may shift translation expenses to the requesting 
party.157  In electronic discovery, factors that trigger cost-shifting 
include overbroad requests, information not likely to be found, 
privileged information, requests that require special programming, 
or the inability to access the information because it is not available in 
the form requested.158 
                                                          
Discovery of Computer-Based Information in Civil Litigation 2 (Sept. 13, 2002), at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi10.pdf/$file/ElecDi10.pdf (on 
file with the American University Law Review) (summarizing that three out of five 
magistrate judges handled issues about computer-based evidence during discovery 
disputes and that the problem of sharing the costs during retrieval of computerized 
information was frequently reported as an issue).  Moreover, attorneys generally 
preferred rule adjustments to resolve electronic discovery issues more than judges, 
who thought the Civil Rules had no major effect on how to accommodate electronic 
discovery issues.  Id.  These findings were based on a survey of 110 magistrate judges, 
17 attorneys working on ten key cases relevant to computer discovery, and 10 
computer experts.  Id. at 2, 5, 9. 
 155. Id. at 2. 
 156. See id. at 6 (listing breakdown of matters with relevant computer discovery 
issues as twenty-six percent employment, twenty-three percent general commercial 
litigation, and eighteen percent patent or copyright issues). 
 157. See Robins, supra note 1, at 475 (noting the requesting party usually must pay 
a fair portion of fees and expenses for retrieving computer-related information from 
a producing party’s expert); see also Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 
F. Supp. 1122, 1136, 1141 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (requiring that the requesting party bear 
costs for the producing party to retrieve documentation pertaining to a computer 
program used by the producing party’s expert witness and to pay for a computer 
expert to analyze the computer program).  Converting a foreign language document 
into a usable form may take additional steps for the requesting party to read the 
documents.  Compare Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 69 F.R.D. 489, 490 
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (requiring producing party to pay for English translation of 
documents because it was a reasonable cost of doing business in the United States), 
with Daewoo Elec. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1986) (finding that normal and reasonable translation of data into usable form was 
an ordinary and foreseeable burden). 
 158. See, e.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 530-32 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a failure to explain the basis for a belief that the materials would be 
relevant meant extensive electronic discovery of hard drive to find whether memo 
had been modified would be “extremely cumbersome and expensive”); Van 
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Another approach to allocating the burden of costs during 
electronic discovery is to allow cost-sharing rather than cost-shifting.159  
Notably, even where the court shifts costs to the requesting party for 
particular requests, overall, both parties will share the discovery 
costs.160  In Williams v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,161 the requesting 
party paid the costs for special programming to encode and to 
duplicate data while the producing party paid costs to search and 
produce requested documents.162  Similarly, in National Union Electric 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,163 the court required a party 
who requested both hard copy and electronic versions of data to pay 
the extra costs of duplication, as the burden of producing the 
documents was disproportional to the benefit of multiple copies.164  
Cost-sharing offers an attractive alternative in cases involving complex 
discovery costs since it distributes the burden among the parties. 
2. Denying cost-shifting in favor of broad discovery 
Not surprisingly, the majority of requests related to cost-shifting in 
discovery are denied.165  Judges have extraordinary caseloads and lack 
                                                          
Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 189 F.R.D. 440, 441 (D. Or. 1999) 
(disallowing overbroad access and requiring discovering party to specify what it is 
seeking); Stalling-Daniel v. Northern Trust Co., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1406, 1408 (N.D. 
Ill. 2002) (holding that speculations alone are not enough to impose discovery costs 
on the producing party); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 
F.R.D. 634, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (requiring the requesting party bear costs because 
the tape did not exist prior to the request).  Compare In re P. R. Elec. Power Auth., 
687 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to require producing party to pay costs of 
translating from Spanish to English for the requesting party), with Anti-Monopoly, 
Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120(LMM)(AJP), 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 23, 1996) (requiring cost-shifting where producing party had to create “special 
programming” in order to access information).  The court gave the plaintiff the 
option of paying extraction costs if it required data in electronic format.  Id. 
 159. See, e.g., Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(permitting cost-splitting for paper printouts even though information was also 
available on readable format disk); In re Two Appeals Arising Out Of San Juan 
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956, 967 (1st Cir. 1993) (ordering cost-
sharing and indicating that “[r]eallocating cost-sharing assessments affords a way of 
balancing case-specific inequities”). 
 160. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal 
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 457-59 (1994) (supporting the idea of a cost-sharing 
method for discovery requests, allowing the producing party to shift some of the 
costs back to the discovering party rather than pay for the entire discovery request). 
 161. 119 F.R.D. 648 (W.D.K.Y. 1987). 
 162. See id. at 651 (ordering parties to share costs because of the undue hardship 
imposed in terms of time and expense in order to encode manually the massive 
documentation necessary to analyze the raw data and expert reports). 
 163. 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 164. See id. at 1262 (requiring production of hard copy and electronic version of 
data but shifting costs to the discovering party to pay for the creation of duplicate 
tapes). 
 165. See Giacobbe, supra note 90, at 267 (noting that the majority of courts require 
the producing party to bear all costs of production of electronic discovery requests).  
REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/1/2005  10:47:18 AM 
2004] ADJUDICATING BEYOND ORDINARY BUSINESS 283 
the time necessary to deal with routine discovery disputes.166  As a 
result, generalized searches are often allowed and broad requests to 
compel all electronic files are granted.167  In addition, courts are 
hesitant to shift costs to the requesting party where the producing 
party uses discovery costs as a shield to avoid upgrading computer 
systems.168  Even cost-shifting requests by representative plaintiffs 
require parties deriving the benefit to generally bear the cost of 
compiling information.169 
Given the low chance of successfully shifting costs during electronic 
discovery, the pre-trial conference that requires a discussion of 
discovery strategies by both parties may be an important way—
perhaps the only way—to limit burden.170  By bringing discovery issues 
to the attention of both parties earlier, there may be increased 
incentives to settle fruitless disputes in which it would otherwise prove 
too burdensome for parties to comply with discovery requests.171 
                                                          
Moreover, establishing a professional relationship with the court requires effort to 
avoid discovery battles.  See Jack J. Goldwood, Professional Conduct:  Building Credibility 
with the Court, FOR THE DEFENSE, Jan. 2004, at 14 (suggesting lawyers avoid taking up 
discovery issues with the court since the court should not play the role of “babysitter” 
during pre-trial litigation). 
 166. See Richard Corbett & Virginia R. Llewellyn, The Next Discovery Frontier, 21 
ACCA DOCKET 116, 128 (2003) (noting that judges have little patience for cost-
shifting disputes because of their enormous workload, including 250,000 civil cases 
often pending at one time in the federal court system). 
 167. See Kleiner v. Burns, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 644, 649 (D. Kan. 2000) (including 
voice mail messages and files, back-up voice mail files, e-mail messages and files, 
backup e-mail files, deleted e-mails, data files, program files, backup and archival 
tapes, temporary files, system history files, web site information stored in textual, 
graphical or audio format, web site log files, cache files, cookies, and other 
electronically-recorded information, despite the failure to particularize the nature 
and location of the electronic data). 
 168. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (finding that plaintiff should 
not have to pay for defendant’s choice of electronic storage and management). 
 169. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978) (drawing 
an analogy to cost-shifting requests during discovery and finding that the defendant 
in a class action lawsuit should not bear the expense of compiling a class member list 
and that the cost must be borne by the plaintiff). 
 170. See David H. Schultz & J. Robert Keena, Discovery Challenges in the Electronic 
Age, 24 PA. LAW 24, 25-26 (2002) (discussing the importance of the pre-trial 
conference to gauge costs anticipated during discovery under Rule 26(f) insofar as 
the conference purports to resolve conflicts related to discovery, such as complex 
requests to conduct electronic discovery). 
 171. Bruce Rubenstein, Electronic Discovery Costs Are Leveraging Settlements, CORP. 
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1997, at 26.  But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW § 21.5 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the more predictable an outcome, the more 
likely parties will facilitate settlement, but the failure to volunteer information may 
induce a higher settlement). 
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II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNDUE BURDEN TEST VERSUS THE 
INACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENT 
The Zubulake decision may signal a movement in the direction of 
judicial efficiency since it creates a bright line test to follow regarding 
cost-shifting in electronic discovery, even though it is not binding on 
the federal courts.172  Unfortunately, a side effect of the new 
inaccessibility test is the possibility of reduced chances for producing 
parties to allocate costs to the requesting party where a 
disproportionately broad request would otherwise cause undue 
burden.173 
Looking beyond the format of information requested, the Federal 
Rules examine whether the producing party would experience 
disproportionate burden compared to the benefit received by the 
requesting party.174  During traditional discovery, common factors of 
undue burden often trigger shifting costs to the requesting party.  
Analogous requests during traditional discovery considered unduly 
burdensome include such factors as the number of documents, 
sensitivity of the information embedded within the documents, 
relevance of the information, more convenient alternative locations 
of information, and technical complexity of the documents 
requested.175 
                                                          
 172. See In re Baker, 264 B.R. 759, 763 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (reciting that 
according to the doctrine of stare decisis, one court’s decision does not bind another 
unless the latter is an inferior court); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Int’l Bhd. 
of Elec. Workers Local 15, 961 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing 
how a decision from one court does not bind other courts of appeals or other district 
courts yet may persuade a court’s legal analysis and provide guidance during 
interpretation of similar issues).  But see POSNER, supra note 171, at § 20.4 (noting that 
“stare decisis is less rigidly adhered to the more rapidly the society is changing”).  
While greater predictability may speed up judicial decisions, unpredictable 
externalities such as technology change may in fact hinder judicial decision-making.  
Id. 
 173. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 36-37 (noting that the court will only 
entertain cost-shifting in disputes where the data is relatively inaccessible and thus 
results in a corresponding challenge to corporate counsel to examine existing 
document retention policies in light of the new development in Zubulake). 
 174. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 98, at 6 (describing the proportionality test 
according to Rule 26(b) that enables courts to halt discovery or impose costs on the 
requesting party where undue burden exists).  
 175. See, e.g., Coker v. Duke & Co., 177 F.R.D. 682, 685-86 (M.D. Ala. 1998) 
(finding that burden of production outweighed production costs for a document 
request of all information and all documents related to anyone ever discharged from 
defendant company, as the broad request for sensitive information showed little 
relevance); United States v. Upton, No. Civ. 3:92-CV-00524(AWT), 1995 WL 264247, 
at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 1995) (finding that a request for information already 
furnished posed an undue burden); Zonaras ex rel. Zonaras v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
No. C-3-94-161, 1996 WL 1671236, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 1996) (considering the 
technical complexity of litigation, relevance of issues, defendant’s financial ability to 
pay for the document production, and public policy implications when examining 
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By contrast, the inaccessibility test explained in Zubulake ignores 
undue burden and allocates costs where the state of the information 
is relatively inaccessible rather than according to a cost-benefit 
analysis.176  While Zubulake considers undue burden on the producing 
party when allocating discovery costs, the request must first fall into 
the category of inaccessible data.177  The undue burden test allows for 
flexibility and considers electronic discovery on a case-by-case basis, 
whereas the inaccessibility test shifts costs in narrow cases where 
electronically discoverable information resides in a format or location 
that is not accessible.178 
A. The Undue Burden Test 
The “undue burden” test espoused in Rowe179 is a flexible standard 
that looks at the individual facts of each case without adhering to a 
limiting rule of accessibility.  The test balances the benefit of the 
electronic discovery request against the impact on the producing 
party and expands proportionality analysis within the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in Rule 26.180  The courts have shifted the cost of 
electronic discovery back to the requesting party where undue 
burden or excessive expenses exist.181 
The advantage of having a flexible standard, such as the Rowe test, 
is that it enables the law to conform to the equities of each individual 
case.182  Rather than limiting cost-shifting based on the state of the 
                                                          
whether or not expense of proposed discovery outweighed the benefits of 
production); Mobley v. Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-3120, 1996 WL 
363496, at *1 (E.D. La. June 27, 1996) (indicating that the availability of a less 
burdensome and more convenient source of information squares with the 
requirements of Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and precludes redundant discovery). 
 176. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20 (deciding cost-shifting based on the type 
of electronic information requested and the ability to retrieve the electronic file 
rather than on a balancing test of multiple factors). 
 177. See id. at 324 (investigating undue burden only where data first falls into 
inaccessible category). 
 178. See infra Part II.B (suggesting the new Zubulake test narrows cost-shifting). 
 179. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
 180. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 98, at 2 (comparing the proportionality test, 
a common sense way of determining whether costs and time needed to comply with 
discovery request are disproportionate to the value of the material, with Rowe factors, 
which further guide courts regarding how to weigh the impact of discovery requests). 
 181. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433. 
 182. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and 
Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 255 (1997) (noting that the law 
adjusts to societal changes and achieves fair results, yet remains rigid enough to 
maintain stability, predictability, and uniformity); see also John Hasnas, The Myth of the 
Rule of Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 199, 213 (1995) (positing that “the more definite and 
rigidly-determined the rules of law become, the less the legal system is able to do 
justice to the individual” and that “if the law were fully determinate, it would have no 
ability to consider the equities of the particular case”). 
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electronic information, a flexible standard examines factors such as 
bargaining power, benefit of the requested materials to the 
discovering party, and the purpose of the information in light of the 
issues in the case. 
The undue burden test employs cost-benefit analysis by examining 
the total circumstances of each case.183  Since the judicial role of 
managing discovery in the federal system is subject to increased 
scrutiny because of the excessive costs of litigation,184 a more 
economically efficient approach to managing discovery shifts costs 
based on the bargaining power of each party.185  In other words, 
producing parties would share discovery costs based on the ability to 
pay,186 not on a limiting rule that based cost-shifting on the state of 
data.  The value of the discoverable information will determine 
whether or not the discovering party is willing to pay to retrieve 
evidence.187 
The disadvantage to having a flexible standard like the undue 
burden test is that it is expensive to enforce, especially in high-
frequency cases such as electronic discovery disputes.  By contrast, a 
bright line rule costs less to administer.188  Even though rules may be 
                                                          
 183. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 198 (analyzing costs, needs, and benefits of 
producing electronic evidence through the Sedona principles, a set of best practices 
conjured up by The Sedona Conference Working Group, a think tank for electronic 
document production).  The requesting party’s inquiry should consider whether the 
data is redundant, irrelevant, or subject to preservation as part of the cost-benefit 
analysis discussed in the Sedona Principles.  See id. at 209-11 (considering 
reasonableness of electronic document production by examining document 
retention procedures, preservation strategy, type of storage systems, and ability to 
access files weighed against the benefit and potential for discoverable information 
within electronic data). 
 184. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(1990) (implementing legislation to reduce civil litigation costs and delays in federal 
courts); Press Release, Brookings Institution, Brookings Task Force Urges Continued 
Attention to Civil Justice Reform (Mar. 20, 1997), at 
http://www.brook.edu/comm/news/19970320civil.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (finding that active judicial management, where 
implemented, can reduce congestion in the civil justice system).  As a way to reduce 
costs and management, early case management and discovery planning will alleviate 
strain in the judiciary.  See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:  
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA 40 (1998), at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR941 (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (estimating that mandatory discovery management planning 
reduced time until disposition by an average of 104 days). 
 185. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 160, at 445 (analyzing the discovery 
process as contributing to the probability of dispute resolution because it reveals bias 
and potential bargaining power). 
 186. See id. at 456 (suggesting a balanced approach to discovery to ensure 
symmetry in transaction costs by requiring each party to bear its own costs until the 
“switching point” where the value becomes greater to the requesting party and 
therefore shifts the remaining cost of discovery to the adversary). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
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more costly to promulgate than standards due to the added costs of 
designing and implementing the rules, the application of rules 
reveals the cost savings.189 
Moreover, managerial judging during discovery may also have 
disadvantages by reducing litigation efficiency by adding complexity 
to the pretrial proceedings, and by contributing to a backlog of cases, 
or worse, by threatening impartiality in order to save judicial 
resources.190  In fact, some studies suggest that discovery abuse is the 
major cause of delay in litigation.191  Electronic discovery disputes 
amongst parties frequently occur, yet cost-shifting occurs in lower 
frequency due to the judicial preference against quibbling over the 
minutiae of discovery costs.192 
B. The Inaccessibility Test 
A rigid rule, such as the inaccessibility test in Zubulake, requires less 
judicial involvement and will encourage greater administrative 
efficiency.193  The inaccessibility test requires the court to analyze the 
type of electronic data requested and whether the process needed to 
access the data requires an “extraordinary step”194 in order to 
complete the discovery request.  A bright line rule based on 
accessibility may result in fewer discovery disputes and cost less 
                                                          
557 (1992) (suggesting that the application of rules is less expensive than standards 
because of the ability to reflect on the content of previously promulgated rules rather 
than having to determine application after the conduct occurs). 
 189. Id. at 562-63.  Further, where conduct is frequent, the savings realized in rule 
application will likely exceed the initial costs incurred during rule creation.  Id. at 
621. 
 190. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger:  The Shortage of Adjudicative 
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 
1832-36 (1986) (discussing the shortcomings of managerial judging and its failure to 
solve discovery abuse problems).  More aggressive participation in settlement 
discussions may encourage settlement and deny parties the full opportunity to be 
heard.  Id.  See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(expanding the judicial role in order to supervise and limit discovery during a 
lengthy, complex case so that the system could protect parties from excessive 
expenses, particularly where there is a possibility of abuse). 
 191. See Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues:  A Survey 
of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spent at Least Half of Their Time on General Civil 
Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735 (1989) (listing abuse of discovery and an insufficient 
amount of judges for caseload as the top two reasons for litigation delays). 
 192. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (noting the types of requests 
where courts have failed to award cost-shifting). 
 193. See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE:  THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 185 (1990) (examining the tension 
between adjudication and administration because caseload management increasingly 
pressures courts to find ways to minimize decision times). 
 194. See Zubulake II, 216 F.R.D. at 290 (explaining that an “extraordinary step” 
such as the cost of restoration and search may be subject to cost-shifting in order to 
make inaccessible materials accessible (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4)). 
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overall to adjudicate.195  However, if a trial judge lacks the familiarity 
with computers and fails to understand the complexities of 
technology, it may be difficult to determine whether the electronic 
information is accessible or not.196 
In addition, a rigid rule fails to consider the totality of the 
circumstances and may provide more incentive for discovery abuse.197  
While the Federal Rules may limit unduly burdensome or expensive 
discovery, Zubulake narrows the burden analysis to cases where data is 
inaccessible.198  Hence, requesting parties have free reign to cast a 
wide net during discovery requests.199 
Even though a clear test for cost-shifting may increase judicial 
efficiency, it does so at the expense of justice and may encourage 
requests without boundaries, which could stifle business.200  Indeed, 
                                                          
 195. See Stephen D. Easton & Franklin D. Romines II, Dealing with Draft Dodgers:  
Automatic Production of Expert Witness Reports, 22 REV. LITIG. 355, 386 (2003) (noting 
that a clear and straightforward guideline under Rule 26 in the context of the work 
product doctrine avoids future battles regarding discovery and ultimately reduces 
discovery costs). 
 196. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaw, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
505, 566 (2000) (suggesting that many courts treat discovery problems leniently since 
judges in district courts generally spend only five percent of their time on discovery 
matters).  Moreover, the lack of technical prowess in the judiciary may pose 
problems because it could unfairly provide an advantage to parties who misbehave, 
as judges devote minimal time to discovery issues.  Id. at 567.  See also Withers, supra 
note 58, at 2 (revealing that discovery management may include up to 93 percent of 
electronic discovery suggesting the proliferation of technology and the 
corresponding impact on the judicial branch).  Furthermore, a survey conducted on 
behalf of the Federal Judicial Center determined that education and training of the 
judiciary regarding electronic discovery concerns is warranted.  See JOHNSON ET AL., 
supra note 154 (describing the perceived need for further education of the judiciary 
regarding electronic discovery issues).  But see James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts 
Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1055-60 (1985) (canvassing arguments for bright line 
rules and supporting the institutional competency philosophy because courts are 
uniquely able to resolve complex matters, respond to changing circumstances, and 
maintain objectivity during litigation). 
 197. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (arguing that 
requiring restoration of backup tapes creates a settlement weapon to use against the 
producing party).  For practical purposes, a corporate president would prefer to 
settle a lawsuit for $100,000 rather than bear the costs of $300,000 for restoring 
backup tapes.  Id. 
 198. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318 (suggesting that courts shift costs to the 
requesting party only in cases where the electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such 
as with backup data). 
 199. See infra Part III (discussing how casting a wide net increases the chances of 
abuse in the discovery process). 
 200. See Debra Rosenberg, Hard Pill to Swallow, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 46 
(indicating that the threat of litigation “hangs over every move” of professionals); see 
also Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 45 
(showing that society ultimately pays for litigation and that it paralyzes professionals 
and hinders competition because of the high costs).  Indeed, to avoid litigation and 
excessive jury awards, corporations often settle.  See Rubenstein, supra note 171, at 26 
(discussing incentives to settle cases rather than face the boundless costs of 
litigation). 
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discovery comes at a great expense for both plaintiffs and defendants; 
the expense may be even more burdensome for the plaintiff who may 
not be able to afford the cost of litigation.201  However, courts also 
need to recognize that judicial efficiency is not the sole criterion and 
that other costs may outweigh a bright-line rule.  Limiting the 
opportunities to shift costs to the requesting party may improve the 
bargaining power of plaintiffs and result in unreasonably high 
litigation costs that undermine judicial efficiency in the long run.202 
The Northern District of California has applied the Zubulake factors 
in a dispute between two corporations but fine-tuned its definition of 
inaccessible data.203  The tipping factor in OpenTV v. Liberate 
Technologies204 hinged on undue burden.  In an effort to allocate costs 
proportionally, the court rejected a formalistic view of the 
inaccessibility test and applied the Zubulake test based on the totality 
of the circumstances.205  According to the court, the extraordinary 
steps necessary to retrieve electronic data requested rendered the 
request inaccessible, despite the fact that the definition of 
inaccessible from Zubulake206 only discussed forms of storage, not 
retrieval of information.207 
                                                          
 201. See Brad M. Friedman, Mass Products Liability Litigation:  A Proposal for 
Dissemination of Discovered Material Covered by a Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 
1140 (1985) (revealing the constraints on plaintiffs whose legal rights may be stifled 
because of the high cost of funding a lawsuit due to high discovery expenses); see also 
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-100 (1974) (explaining the concept of one-shotters, 
parties who only occasionally utilize courts, and repeat players, parties who often 
engage in litigation over time, and the correspondingly higher costs and risks for the 
one-shotters).  But see Taylor & Thomas, supra note 198, at 48 (providing a synopsis of 
sympathetic juries that have awarded plaintiffs up to $28 billion for punitive damages 
against corporations). 
 202. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text (discussing how economic leverage 
forces unreasonable settlement); see also Taylor & Thomas, supra note 198, at 48 
(explaining how “plaintiff-friendly” juries have the effect of increasing the number of 
lawsuits instigated by individuals which ultimately undermines judicial efficiency by 
clogging the courts). 
 203. See OpenTV v. Liberate Tech., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding 
that electronic data stored in a manner difficult to produce in usable form passes the 
hurdle of Zubulake’s inaccessibility test and results in cost-sharing for the search and 
restoration of electronic source code). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. at 479 (warranting cost-shifting because the burden of extraction and 
copying the data is high and both parties are similarly situated, even though four of 
the seven factors weighed against cost-shifting during the dispute between two 
corporate parties). 
 206. Compare Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319 (including backup servers used for 
emergency purposes in its definition of inaccessible and considering the type of 
storage device to determine accessibility), with OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 478 (examining 
the method of extraction and the total burden on the producing party in order to 
determine accessibility, noting that the producing party needed to take extra steps to 
obtain electronic data and hence qualified as inaccessible).  
 207. See OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 477 (drawing similarities amongst backup tapes and 
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The court framed inaccessibility according to whether the data 
retrieval required excessive time and expense in order to produce the 
requested files, constituting an undue burden.208  Surprisingly, the 
cost of searching for data was included in the definition of 
“inaccessible” and the electronic discovery request was considered 
unduly burdensome.209  Consequently, the OpenTV application of the 
inaccessibility test analyzed whether retrieving data presented an 
undue burden in order to determine accessibility. 
III. THE NEW RULE FROM ZUBULAKE CREATES INCENTIVES FOR ABUSE 
The primary concern with the new inaccessibility test from Zubulake 
is that it limits a court’s ability to allocate costs and may result in an 
increase of speculative discovery requests that yield non-responsive 
information.210  Prior to Zubulake, a discovery request that failed to 
particularize a basis for discovery was “extremely cumbersome and 
expensive” and thus an undue burden.211  For example, the failure to 
specify the type of memorandum or explain the basis for the belief 
that materials would be relevant would not raise a trial-worthy issue or 
justify permitting electronic discovery of a hard drive to find out 
whether a document was modified.212  However, Zubulake eliminates 
the factor examining the purpose in which the responding party 
keeps the data213 and determines undue burden only after passing the 
threshold test of inaccessibility.214  Requesting parties correspondingly 
have broad discretion in fashioning document requests.215 
                                                          
the process of extracting source code where the ordinary organization of the 
electronic information in both cases results in difficult retrieval). 
 208. See id. (noting that 125-150 hours of work to extract source code requested by 
plaintiff, OpenTV, qualified as inaccessible, as the time was “unduly burdensome and 
potentially expensive”). 
 209. See id. at 479 (finding the expense involved in extracting and copying the 
source code warranted some cost-shifting). 
 210. See Wagener, supra note 5, at 1897 (discussing the reluctance to shift costs 
due to the unfair and wasteful nature of fishing expeditions). 
 211. See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 531-33 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(requiring that discovery expose a potential trial-worthy issue and affirming district 
court’s holding that Fennell insufficiently described her reason for accessing First 
Step’s hard drive as resulting in substantial costs and risks). 
 212. See id. at 533 (failing to show evidence of discoverable fabrication of 
“autodating” information embedded in material requested for production). 
 213. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (reasoning that the purpose for which a party 
keeps data is not relevant to the data’s accessibility). 
 214. See id. (discussing how accessibility guides the determination of undue 
burden). 
 215. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 37 (noting the limitations on cost-shifting 
correspondingly increases the breadth of information requests). 
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A. Bright Line Rule Considers Legitimacy of Discovery Requests                 
in Narrow Cases 
Prior to the bright line rule from Zubulake, courts analyzed the 
distinct facts of the case to allocate costs during electronic discovery 
disputes.216  By conducting a cost-benefit analysis, courts allocated 
costs in proportion to the utility of the information requested.217  In 
McPeek v. Ashcroft,218 the court held that usefulness of the information 
requested should justify the cost incurred.219  Similarly, the court in 
Byers v. Illinois State Police220 looked at usefulness, as defined by 
relevance, and determined that a motion to compel would be 
granted in cases where the electronic information is related to an 
issue on trial.221  In each case, and particularly emphasized in Stallings-
Daniel v. Northern Trust Co.,222 speculation alone is not enough to 
compel discovery, otherwise it would be an undue burden without 
justifiable benefit.223  However, because data was accessible in these 
aforementioned cases, these overbroad requests might be permitted 
under the Zubulake rationale despite the undue burden.224 
B. Triggering Change:  Creating Local Rule Alternatives                        
and Modifying Business Behavior 
Zubulake may increase incentives to make data inaccessible and may 
alternatively undermine judicial efficiency through increased 
litigation because of the power advantage given to requesting parties.  
                                                          
 216. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428-32 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (examining the factual circumstances based on flexible factors). 
 217. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 98, at 2 (describing how to determine 
whether discovery disproportionately burdens the producing party compared to the 
value of the requested material). 
 218. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 219. See id. at 34 (applying the economic principle of “marginal utility” to 
discovery costs in that the greater likelihood that a backup tape contains relevant 
information, the greater justification to shift costs to the requesting party). 
 220. No. 99 C8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *14 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002). 
 221. See id. at *14 (granting motion to compel evidence for requested documents 
likely to be responsive). 
 222. No. 01 C2290, 2002 WL 385566, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2002). 
 223. See id. at *1 (holding that mere conjecture that data relates to an issue at trial 
is not enough to compel discovery of electronic data); McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34 
(noting that a “likelihood of finding something” does not outweigh the risk of a 
costly search). 
 224. See Stallings-Daniel, 2003 WL 385566, at *1 (ruling that the plaintiff failed to 
show a compelling need to justify the cost of production of e-mail chains and other 
historical information embedded within documents that might have revealed pre-
discovery tampering); McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 32 (disallowing broad discovery under an 
undue burden test where the type of data requested included backup tapes of e-mails 
deleted by the user); Byers, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11 (requesting data from old e-
mails generated from an e-mail program no longer in use at the company 
disproportionately burdened producing party). 
REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/1/2005  10:47:18 AM 
292 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:257 
Consequently, a potential trend might arise in state courts that would 
shift costs back to the requesting party for electronic information not 
kept in the usual course of business and could inspire a change in the 
rules.225  Changes in local rules of practice and procedure often give 
rise to amendments to the Federal Rules, as state courts serve as a 
proving ground for judicial change.226 
If the Zubulake rule becomes the norm227 and requires data to be 
inaccessible before the court will consider shifting costs to the 
requesting party during electronic discovery, this may create 
incentives228 to make data more inaccessible because the clear rule 
hinges on accessibility.  Corporate leaders may point to the excessive 
costs of retrieving emergency data from some far-off data center with 
backup servers in India229 as an excuse for delay and as an unfounded 
justification for cost-shifting.230  Even if regulations require document 
retention policies that store electronic documents longer,231 the 
regulations apply to records, not all forms of data.232  This may 
                                                          
 225. See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS GENERAL 
COUNSEL COMMITTEE, A PROPOSED MODEL FOR STATE RULES RE:  ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
n.2, at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/rules_debate/model_state_rule.html 
(Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with The American University Law Review) (suggesting that 
states such as Texas have appropriately addressed the unique concerns of electronic 
discovery costs by shifting costs for requests outside the scope of ordinary business). 
 226. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (noting “one of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . .”). 
 227. Searching for clarity on how to deal with electronic discovery disputes, several 
district courts adopted the Zubulake approach when analyzing whether or not to shift 
costs to the requesting party.  See, e.g., Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 422 
(D. Del. 2003) (citing Zubulake factors to determine whether to shift burden of 
production costs during electronic discovery); Thompson v. United States Dep’t of 
Hous. and Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003) (applying Zubulake test to 
determine whether to categorize data as inaccessible and subsequently analyze 
burden). 
 228. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Stephanie Overby, Inside Outsourcing in India, CIO MAG., June 1, 2003, at 
http://www.cio.com/archive/060103/outsourcing.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (estimating from 1/2 to 2/3 of Fortune 500 companies 
outsource technical support to India, demonstrating global reach of electronically 
stored information). 
 230. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 37 (suggesting that because corporations may 
strategically restrict “accessibility” to effectively shift costs to the plaintiff, attorneys 
should study the Zubulake decisions in order to assess the risk of cost-shifting); see also 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 4 (1996) (preaching that immorality in the market 
may be due to the American desire to win rather than to play by the rules). 
 231. Cf. Final Rule:  Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2003) (citing the 
requirement that accounting firms retain materials from audits of client financial 
statements for seven years as an example of record retention regulations). 
 232. See Peter Sloan, Retention, Preservation, and Spoliation of Electronic Data, GLASSER 
LEGALWORKS, WL EDRMS-GLASS-CLE 24, 25 (2002) (explaining that electronic data 
retention may not require retaining all data unless necessary for legal or business 
purposes). 
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encourage prompt removal of outdated files as long as files are not 
deleted out of bad faith or for purposes of litigation.233  However, the 
mere existence of an incentive to purposefully make data inaccessible 
does not guarantee that the court will shift costs to the opposing side, 
as the benefit to the discovering party may nonetheless outweigh any 
perceived burden of retrieval.234 
In the interest of efficiency and in response to common discovery 
issues, some states have created local rules to address cost-shifting 
during electronic discovery and require that parties discuss electronic 
discovery problems during the pre-trial conference as set forth in 
local rules.235  The Federal Rules do not specify that litigants need to 
include electronic discovery issues in the Rule 26(f) conference.236 
In addition, some state rules may make cost-shifting mandatory for 
accessing data outside the course of ordinary business.237  For 
example, in Texas, there is an express provision governing electronic 
discovery that limits discovery to electronic documents kept in the 
ordinary course of business; otherwise, the costs shift to the 
                                                          
 233. See id. (noting that by purging documents, companies may reduce storage 
and retrieval costs of information assets).  But see Simon Prop. Group v. mySimon, 
Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (permitting the discovery of “deleted” 
computer records). 
 234. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 33 (demonstrating that adversaries may try to 
fool judges and opposing counsel into believing that large volumes of data are 
unmanageable); see also Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 309 
F. Supp. 2d 459, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that, despite the inaccessibility of 
the information requested, there was no justification to shift the costs to the 
requesting party when compared to the total monetary stake under the Zubulake 
test). 
 235. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 211 (citing U.S. DIST. CT. WYO. L. R. 
26.1(d)(3)(a) and U.S. DIST. CT. ARK. L. R. 26.1 to compare local rule requirements 
that require parties to clarify what will be at issue during electronic discovery to 
federal rules that lack such explicit requirements to resolve electronic discovery 
disputes at the required federal Rule 26(f) pre-trial conference).  As Redgrave points 
out, the rule in Wyoming federal courts indicates that parties must meet and confer 
about matters related to computer-based information, e-mail information, deleted 
information, and back-up data during the federal Rule 26(f) conference.  Id.  
Likewise, he notes that the Arkansas rule requires parties to include in the pre-trial 
conference report filed pursuant to federal Rule 26(f) “[w]hether any party will 
likely be requested to disclose or produce information from electronic or computer-
based media . . . .”  Id. at 211 (citing U.S. DIST. CT. ARK. L. R. 26.1).  See also In re 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002) (discussing the importance 
of having a conference to prevent problems with electronic discovery), construed in 
Redgrave, supra note 21, at 211. 
 236. See Schultz & Keena, supra note 170, at 25-26 (noting the differences between 
local rules and the default pre-trial conference requirement under Rule 26(f)). 
 237. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (requiring the requesting party to “specifically 
request production of electronic or magnetic data and specify the form in which the 
requesting party wants it produced”); MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (stating that “the court 
may also order that the requesting party pay the reasonable expenses of any 
extraordinary steps required to retrieve and produce the information”). 
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requesting party.238  By contrast, where electronic materials are not 
available in the ordinary course of business, yet the court finds there 
is a sufficient need to compel production, Texas shifts the cost of 
production to the requesting party.239 
The discretionary rules in federal courts governing cost-shifting 
empower judges to decide where to allocate burden, even in cases 
outside the scope of ordinary business.240  By contrast, the Texas rule 
requires courts to shift costs if the data is not available in the ordinary 
course of business.241  The Texas rule that insists on cost-shifting 
where requesting parties seek electronic documents not available in 
the ordinary course of business would trump the Zubulake test for 
state purposes.242  The Texas rule offers a realistic approach that 
anticipates the prohibitive costs inherent in electronic discovery for 
files requested outside the scope of ordinary business and offers a 
better guideline based on business purposes of records rather than 
on the state of the information.243  Other states address electronic 
discovery by creating local rules that shift costs when the perceived 
benefit fails to justify imposing such high costs during discovery.244  By 
                                                          
 238. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (indicating that the responding party must 
produce electronic data “responsive to the request” and “reasonably available to the 
responding party in its ordinary course of business”).  By contrast, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not include an express provision limiting requests for 
electronic files kept in the usual course of business.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) 
(allowing requests for the production of documents and things regardless of whether 
kept during the ordinary course of business); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (specifying 
that a party may produce documents as kept in the usual course of business or may 
organize and label files according to the categories of the requesting party). 
 239. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (shifting costs to the requesting party for electronic 
evidence beyond the regular course of business); see also Thomas Y. Allman, The Case 
for a Preservation Safe Harbor in Requests for E-Discovery:  Despite the Courts’ Increased 
Attention to Dragnet Requests for Production of Electronic Materials, the Scope of Preservation 
Should Be Addressed, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 417, 417 (2003) [hereinafter Safe Harbor] 
(suggesting to the Federal Rules advisory committee that the Texas rule is working to 
eliminate abusive requests for electronic materials). 
 240. See William T. Garcia et al., Electronic Discovery:  Litigation and Antitrust 
Enforcement in a Digital Age, 20 ACCA DOCKET 76, 82 (2002), available at 
http://www.law.com/special/ supplement/e_discovery/litigation_enforcement.html 
(June 18, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing 
commentary from Kenneth Withers, an expert who conducts studies for the Federal 
Judiciary Center regarding electronic discovery, who noted that a judge may consider 
the cost of retrieving information, the burden on the business, and the direct 
relation of the information to the legal issues of the case, instead of requiring 
document discovery or production simply because a document falls legally within the 
scope of discovery). 
 241. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See Safe Harbor, supra note 239, at 417 (explaining that the party seeking 
discovery may obtain information outside the bounds of ordinary business under 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4, where sufficient necessity exists yet, must pay for the costs, 
including the attorney costs). 
 244. See MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (noting Mississippi includes a local rule that may 
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focusing on business requirements rather than technical 
requirements, these local and state rule alternatives solve the 
problem of burdensome electronic discovery in a practical manner.245 
C. Straining Resources and Inducing Settlement 
The prohibitive costs of discovering electronic information from 
unduly broad data requests may encourage unnecessary 
settlements.246  When a requesting party seeks electronic data, this 
strains IT staff resources, and the expense of performing the task of 
retrieval may force settlement.247  Moreover, the producing party may 
not use the tedious process of searching for records trapped in 
various locations and formats as a shield during litigation.248 
Most cases end without going to trial249 and settle without 
substantial discovery.250  Discovery costs may create unnecessary 
                                                          
shift costs to the requesting party where the request is beyond the ordinary scope of 
business or fails to specify the format of the electronic information). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Rubenstein, supra note 171, at 26 (finding the threat of increasingly high 
discovery costs related to locating and retrieving electronic files may include seven-
figure price tags, thereby triggering otherwise unnecessary settlements); see also 
Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform:  Mandatory Disclosure, 62 
MISS. L.J. 743, 764 (1993) (showing that parties can gain economic leverage by using 
discovery requests that force settlement); Charles Silver, What We Know and Do Not 
Know About the Impact of Civil Justice on the American Economy and Polity:  Does Civil Justice 
Cost Too Much, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2093 (2002) (demonstrating that litigants use 
discovery tools to harass opponents with burdensome requests); COMMITTEE FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BREAKING THE LITIGATION HABIT:  ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR 
LEGAL REFORM 5 (2000), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report_legal.-
pdf (reporting that discovery encompasses at least eighty percent of litigation costs). 
 247. See CIO CHALLENGE, supra note 127, at 6 (suggesting that the prohibitive cost 
of searching for files not catalogued in Linnen v. A.H. Robins, No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 
462015, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999), a products liability case, forced 
settlement because the requesting party sought to search 823 backup tapes for e-
mails relating to fifteen employees at a cost of over one million dollars to the 
producing party). 
 248. See Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *4 (noting that producing parties absorb 
retrieval costs during discovery, despite the burdensome process and unmanageable 
nature of the technology). 
 249. According to recent statistics, only 6,015 civil cases ended in trial in the U.S. 
District Courts compared to the 259,537 cases terminated in 2002.  LEONIDAS RALPH 
MECHAM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES 
COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 
30, 2002, 126 tbl.C-1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/ 
c01sep02.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review); LEONIDAS RALPH 
MECHAM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL TRIALS COMPLETED, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 
30, 2002 162 tbl.C-7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/ 
c07sep02.pdf (on file with The American University Law Review) (revealing a 2.3 
percent trial rate in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2002 by 
extrapolating the total number of civil cases terminated in 2002, which amounted to 
259,537, compared to 6,015 total civil trials). 
 250. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989) 
(revealing a disheartening finding that most cases end in settlement and that parties 
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pressure for parties to settle, regardless of the merits.  Parties often 
inflate claims and distort settlement value,251 effectively using 
settlement as a weapon.252  Because settlement may not be ideal,253 
necessary alternatives afford litigants a way to resolve disputes in a 
more balanced manner.254  As a last resort, a court may intervene and 
grant a protective order if a plaintiff has a bad motive during 
settlement.255 
Despite the producing party’s reduced ability to shift costs to the 
requesting party and the increased incentive to settle during 
electronic discovery disputes, the Zubulake limitation may provide 
incentives for companies to create more organized business practices 
and processes.256  The party with the most efficient information system 
can ably respond to discovery demands because search and retrieval 
of electronic files will be quick and effortless, thus reducing the 
chance of unnecessary settlement. 
                                                          
who threaten discovery, but never use it, gain the most during settlement 
negotiations). 
 251. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement:  The Impact of Scarcity of 
Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 864-65 (1990) (noting how 
settlement creates pressures to inflate claims). 
 252. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) 
(using discovery for in terrorem increment of settlement value); In re Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting “blackmail settlements” 
may force defendants to settle weak claims to avoid the threat of risky jury verdicts); 
see also Hearings on H.R. 417 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 118, 120 (1994) (testimony of Donald C. 
Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Univ. School of 
Law) (arguing that unyielding discovery costs create incentives to settle meritless 
claims to avoid expenses of discovery).  But see Silver, supra note 246, at 2094 
(arguing discovery costs increase based on complexity of case and case type and not 
due to abusive behavior to drive settlement). 
 253. See Alschuler, supra note 190, at 1821-26 (suggesting settlement deprives 
society of the benefits accompanying public adjudication). 
 254. See Easterbrook, supra note 250, at 646-47 (revealing an idea of loser-pays 
system as an alternative to settlement to encourage more meritorious lawsuits 
because it discourages frivolous lawsuits if the losing party has to pay); Charles B. 
Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 165 (2001) (offering an alternative to settling meritless 
claims by using administrative proceedings to resolve employment disputes to avoid 
costly litigation). 
 255. See Ellen M. Martin et al., Discovery Issues in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 696 PLI/LIT 527, 557 (2003) (describing judicial intervention as a tool to 
protect parties where the plaintiff has the motive to pressure the defendant into a 
settlement). 
 256. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives, 53 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 963, 986-87 (1992) (suggesting document management systems may improve 
the ability to search and retrieve files so long as properly implemented and 
maintained). 
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D. Updating Data Management Practices and Processes 
Zubulake may force corporate counsel to reorganize document 
management policies and procedures because producing parties 
accessing multiple information systems will likely absorb the discovery 
costs.257  Counsel must weigh the need for electronically discoverable 
information against the cost of retrieval, review, and privacy.258  Since 
information technology upgrades and document retention practices 
already implemented are finally boosting productivity, there is an 
additional advantage to create a more organized electronic filing 
system.259  This will likely result in financial savings beyond litigation 
expense reduction and will improve the efficiency of the workforce 
because data will be easier to access.260  Moreover, understanding 
weak links in an electronic system will enable corporate counsel to 
better predict litigation costs and needs.261 
A well-organized document management system will ultimately 
reduce litigation expenses through more efficient document retrieval 
during discovery requests.262  Accordingly, the most effective data 
management system supports quick and accurate retrieval of 
electronic information without compromising the structure of the 
original file.263  By creating a data management strategy, collaborating 
                                                          
 257. See supra Part II.B (hypothesizing that the inaccessibility test deters companies 
with weak document management practices from shielding information systems from 
discovery because Zubulake precludes cost-shifting for accessible yet complex data). 
 258. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 209-11 (revealing the inherent judicial power 
to shift costs in cases where the burden of discovery outweighs benefit).  Counsel 
should bear in mind, costs extend beyond litigation expenses and include exposure 
to privileged information, and also include costs related to the technical expertise 
required to access data.  Id. 
 259. See Productivity, supra note 5, at 62-63 (finding that information technology 
investment reaps its benefits years after implementation). 
 260. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures:  
Evaluating the FDA’s Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 325 (1986) 
(highlighting that accessibility influences the ways in which agencies organize and 
maintain records and will improve agency efficiency through easier access to 
documents); see also Productivity, supra note 5, at 62-63 (suggesting IT has an impact 
on productivity in that American labor productivity increased at an annual rate of 
3.4% since 2000, attributable to the sharp increase in technology investment). 
 261. See Burke & Kummer, supra note 60, at 19-20 (finding that ready access to 
computer records increases the ability to predict exposure and may save corporate 
counsel millions of dollars by avoiding judgments, legal fees, and unnecessary 
settlements). 
 262. See J. TIMOTHY SPREHE & HUMMINGBIRD LTD., ENTERPRISE RECORDS 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES S6-S7, at http://www.kmworld.com/publications/white 
papers/records/humm-ingbird&sprehe.pdf (Sept. 1, 2003) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (discussing how records management strategies 
may help reduce legal and financial risks and liabilities). 
 263. See D. Chad McCoy, A Long-Term Data Management Strategy Reaps Benefits, 4 
ANDREWS E-BUS. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2003) (suggesting that document retrieval and 
production requires long-term retention planning between the IT department and 
general counsel so that information garnered is in a usable format). 
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with business managers and information technology staff, and 
establishing policies and procedures for document retention, 
corporate counsel may help control litigation costs by reducing the 
burden on staff to search, retrieve, and use electronic files.264  
Understanding where there are risks within electronic records will 
further assist corporate counsel in managing costs.265  Because the 
Zubulake rule confines cost-shifting to inaccessible data, corporate 
counsel armed with knowledge about data risks and document 
retention requirements can better prepare for discovery requests and 
forecast burdens. 
Organizations need to maintain e-mail and other records for a 
certain period of time.  This period of time and management of 
records is called document retention.266  Various document and 
record retention regulations exist that govern different industries.267  
Document retention policy requirements may vary according to 
                                                          
 264. See Daryll R. Prescott et al., Electronic Data Balancing Act:  Preserve or Delete?  
Destroying Electronic Data Relevant To a Case Can Result in Severe Sanctions, But Total 
Preservation May Also Cause Harm, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1998, at B7 (involving business 
and IT staff to plan for data preservation based on the existing IT infrastructure and 
business processes necessary for operations may reduce overall costs); CIO 
CHALLENGE, supra note 127, at 4-5 (explaining the competing goals of IT personnel 
and business executives that results in dangerous electronic records management 
practices for companies whose IT personnel fail to collaborate with business 
managers on record management systems).  IT personnel aim to create an 
inexpensive temporary copy of data to restore in case of failure and not for the 
purpose of retrieval, whereas businesses seek to retain files for routine search, 
discovery and retrieval.  Id. 
 265. See Rae Cogar & R. Thomas Howell, Retention:  More Important Than Ever.  In 
the Name of Compliance, BLT Presents Another Perspective on Dealing with Records, 13 BUS. 
L. TODAY 44, 49 (2003) (suggesting that corporate counsel should reduce risks, 
protect critical business assets, and respond to demands of discovery by monitoring, 
auditing, and enforcing record management policies and procedures). 
 266. See generally Redgrave, supra note 21, at 206-07 (revealing the importance of 
developing a records management program and offering document retention policy 
guidelines). 
 267. See FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION, MODEL RECORDKEEPING AND 
RETENTION REGULATION:  A REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE TASK FORCE ON EDI 
AUDIT AND LEGAL ISSUES FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 3 (Mar. 1996), available at 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/modelreg. pdf (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (describing requirements of IRS regulations for retaining electronic 
records containing tax data drawing on IRS Revenue Procedure 91-59 governing 
automated recordkeeping and accounting systems); see also Patrick R. Grady, Discovery 
of Computer Stored Documents and Computer Based Litigation Support Systems:  Why Give Up 
More Than Necessary, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 532-33 n.50 (1996) 
(showing distinctions between industries that require ten to forty years for record 
retention such as Banks and Banking, Business Credit and Assistance, Labor, and 
Emergency Management and Assistance and those that require a length of six years 
for record retention such as Commodity and Securities Exchange, Labor, Mineral 
Resources, Money and Finance, and Public Health); see generally OFFICE OF THE 
FEDERAL REGISTER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO 
RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS (Jan. 1, 1994) (noting record retention schedules 
with triggering events that impact required length of record retention). 
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industry and function of the department, but in general, courts 
require a record retention policy to be reasonable.268  For example, a 
company may not do indirectly what it cannot do directly by 
delegating document retention policies to a third party to avoid 
having to produce the documents upon request during litigation.269  
In addition, an organization may not claim privilege as a defense for 
producing electronic data even though retrieving privileged files may 
involve the added cost of a protective order for opposing counsel to 
access privileged electronic files.270 
While document retention regulations may not distinguish 
between electronic records and paper files, the increased capacity for 
data storage renders electronic documents less expensive to store 
than traditional documents.271  However, corporate counsel may not 
agree that reduced storage price demands increased information 
storage because this would keep potential “smoking guns”272 around 
that would be otherwise eliminated if the usual retention practices 
were followed.273  “Smoking guns” might be embedded deep within 
                                                          
 268. See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(requiring document retention policies to be adjusted to preserve records the 
company believes may be subject to discovery requests); see also Grady, supra note 
267, at 532-33 n.50 (listing different document retention policies according to 
industry and function). 
 269. See S. Diagnostic Assoc. v. Bencosme, 833 So. 2d 801, 802 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“United Auto cannot avoid the mandate of Boecher by employing Southern 
Diagnostic in an attempt to shield itself from inquiries about its relationship with its 
experts.”). 
 270. See Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1999) 
(permitting expert who specialized in the field of electronic discovery to review 
electronic files despite exposure to privileged information because the benefit of 
reviewing files coupled with the protective order ensuring confidentiality outweighed 
the burden of exposing privileged information to expert). 
 271. See Christopher V. Cotton, Document Retention Programs for Electronic Records:  
Applying a Reasonableness Standard to the Electronic Era, 24 J. CORP. L. 417, 418 (1999) 
(arguing that the “tremendous capacity and efficiency” available by electronic means 
should drive longer retention periods because of the reduced costs). 
 272. See Elissa R. Hoffman, Note, Smoking Guns, Stray Remarks, and Not Much In 
Between:  A Critical Analysis of the Federal Circuits’ Inconsistent Application of the Direct 
Evidence Requirement in Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 181, 197 (2002) (defining “smoking guns” as documents that 
could determine the outcome of a case). 
 273. See Robins, supra note 1, at 423 (alluding to safeguards corporate counsel can 
implement to help reduce the burden of electronic document retrieval such as 
throwing away and destroying documents as part of a routine document 
management policy in the course of ordinary business rather than keeping 
unnecessary documents).  But see Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98 C7482, 
2000 WL 1694325, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (finding culpable conduct where 
the defendant, as Chief Executive Officer, had the authority and responsibility to 
implement document management procedures, delegated the function to someone 
who lacked experience, and failed to ensure that his company properly adhered to 
the document management policy). 
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old computer systems that are difficult to access, but are not 
inaccessible.274 
Further, the hidden costs of old computer systems involve litigation 
expenses that would not have to be made were it not for faulty 
document retention practices.275  By strategizing a solution to 
information technology infrastructure concerns through a total data 
preservation strategy, companies can reduce the amount of data 
stored and reduce costs.276  Coordinating internal efforts amongst 
various business departments will ensure better document 
management.277  Corporate counsel can use technology to assist in 
record retention and reduce litigation expenses.278  The additional 
benefit of organized data management includes the reward of 
productivity improvements.279  Historically, the need to compete 
globally forced business process improvements, ultimately triggering 
                                                          
 274. See Robins, supra note 1, at 415 (listing examples of complex electronic data 
such as hidden files that do not appear when a document is printed, system history 
that records when a document was accessed and edited, and source code “genealogy” 
that tracks amendments and deletions to computer software). 
 275. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 32, 35 (indicating that many companies use a 
mix of new and old technologies and will bear the costs of retrieving data from 
“legacy systems,” a term for old computer systems); see also M. Lewis Kinard, Beware 
the Underlying Costs of Using Dated Technology, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 2003, at T3, available at 
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Pre
view&c=LawArticle&cid=1058416408946 (last updated Aug. 14, 2003) (on file with 
the American University Law Review) (suggesting that companies pay hidden costs 
by not upgrading information systems to newer and easier to access technologies 
although the upfront cost of implementing the new software systems requires initial 
investment); Redgrave, supra note 21, at 204 (explaining the cost of doing business 
in the computer age falls on the producing party). 
 276. See Prescott, supra note 264, at B7 (reducing the amount of data preserved 
requires an understanding of technology infrastructure and ownership interests of 
the business managers responsible for the information within the databases). 
 277. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 207 (proposing that an electronic records 
management program should include:  training management about document 
retention in the ordinary course of business; creating practices and customs for 
individual business units geared to business needs; setting limits and communication 
policies about the use of e-mail and other technology systems; implementing policies 
and procedures with an understanding of how business units work together to 
preserve data; and increasing awareness of how data preservation will impact current 
and future litigation); MICHAEL R. OVERLY, E-POLICY:  HOW TO DEVELOP COMPUTER, E-
MAIL, AND INTERNET GUIDELINES TO PROTECT YOUR COMPANY AND ITS ASSETS 91-96 
(1999) (recommending six essentials to every good corporate technology-use policy 
including:  (1) eliciting an understanding that the computer belongs to the business; 
(2) explaining privacy interests; (3) explaining what types of monitoring will occur; 
(4) emphasizing to use care when drafting e-mails; (5) explaining that employees 
must avoid inappropriate content; and (6) requiring sign-off on computer and e-
mail-use policy). 
 278. See Ruth A. Tressel & Daniel J. Noonan, Using Technology to Fend Off Future 
Legal Crises, 21 ACCA DOCKET 87, 97 (2003) (showing that new technologies can help 
counsel isolate relevant electronic files to ensure speedy investigation). 
 279. See Productivity, supra note 5, at 61 (suggesting that productivity improvements 
are finally coming to fruition). 
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better data management in order to efficiently operate and retrieve 
information.280 
Despite some process improvements, the reality of business 
information systems and document retention policies today is 
disorganized.281  Business executives do not know how to search for 
information and need to rely on the information technology 
manager to retrieve, maintain, archive, and be in command of the 
information.282  Additionally, there is a general reluctance by business 
managers to deal with litigation strategies for electronic discovery 
because of their lack of awareness of how technology works.283 
The global reach of information technology and the 
corresponding document management systems may involve privacy 
laws outside of the United States.  In addition, it could put a further 
damper on maintaining records and managing the costs of electronic 
discovery.284  When developing electronic document retention policy 
                                                          
 280. See James Flanigan, Should We Fear High-Pay Job Shift?, LA TIMES, June 22, 2003, 
at C1 (explaining the need to globalize information support by moving jobs overseas 
for businesses to remain competitive in the market-driven economy).  Standardizing 
document management practices and ensuring worldwide employees can easily 
access, exchange, and produce files offers a business challenge but also a discovery 
challenge in order to manage the costs of accessing electronic data in worldwide 
locations.  Id.  See also Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 421-23 n.7 (D. Del. 
2003) (involving a potential cost-shift for a review of technology in European offices 
dating back to 1981); David M. Hudanish, Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity in 
an Evolving Regulatory Framework, 767 PLI/PAT 633, 640 (2003) (suggesting stringent 
European data protection legislation requires mandatory compliance with standards 
for disaster recovery planning and business continuity practices which may impact 
how to conduct electronic discovery overseas). 
 281. See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-Mail and Other 
Computerized Information, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 1995, at 18 (arguing that large companies 
often fail to organize computer files in a coherent fashion, fail to implement a formal 
document retention policy, and lack a catalogued system for backup files, and that 
users within the companies do not properly organize files, resulting in a burdensome 
task of sifting through disorganized data when served with discovery requests).  
However, after the Enron debacle and resulting legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), business organizations care much 
more about information management techniques because of the increased attention 
to good-faith retention policies.  See Daniel E. Toomey & Tamara M. McNulty, 
Sarbanes-Oxley:  How It Will Affect Contractors and Sureties, 23 CONSTR. LAW. 32, 38 
(2003) (suggesting investment in systems and policies or electronic document 
retention will prevent greater costs and problems in the future in the event of 
litigation or government investigation). 
 282. See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Digital Discovery, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 27, 
1999, at A16 (noting that business executives may lack the expertise needed to 
search and locate electronic files, particularly for data residing in older computers 
and backup files). 
 283. See Ashby Jones, What a Mess!  For Corporations, Pileup of Electronic Data Could Be 
Trouble Waiting to Happen, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 2, 2002, at C6 (revealing that many 
companies are unwilling to confront and understand technology, still operate 
departments as if still paper-based, and are generally uncomfortable with electronic 
discovery requests). 
 284. See Julius Melnitzer, Keeping Track of the Invisible Paper Trail:  What Legal 
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guidelines, corporations need to consider the international 
ramifications and how to effectively implement such policies.285  
Furthermore, companies who seek to play fair and maintain moral 
standards will be better off by creating document retention strategies 
that do not compromise corporate integrity.286  Companies across 
most industries must retain electronic files for the required length of 
time to conform to regulations.287  Information technology 
departments may retain electronic files for longer than necessary 
because of a misunderstanding regarding the impact of keeping stale 
documents around, thus spawning a need for legal departments and 
information technology departments to coordinate procedures and 
practices regarding the duration of document retention.288 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the Zubulake decision, the cost of electronic discovery 
is less likely to shift to the requesting party, adding substantial burden 
to the litigation process.  Cost-shifting will be limited at the expense 
of fairness in litigation.  In the end, the increased economic leverage 
gained by requesting parties during discovery will only add to the 
costs society must pay to support such litigious behavior.  
Management of costs in electronic discovery should not evolve to a 
rule based on inaccessibility just because it may increase judicial 
efficiency.  A practical approach would be to question whether 
electronic discovery requires an extraordinary step beyond the 
                                                          
Departments Can Learn from Boeing’s Experience, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2003, at 15, 
available at http://www.cltmag.com/editorial/technology/feb03.cfm (on file with 
the American University Law Review) (exemplifying electronic data retrieval 
problems faced by large global corporations that operate fragmented technology 
systems scattered throughout the world through the Boeing case study).  Dealing 
with global offices may require a difference level of review for privileged information 
in the United States as compared with the European Union.  Id. 
 285. See Kathleen M. Porter et al., Work Station or Purgatory? Steps Toward a Company 
Policy on E-mail and Using the Net, 11 BUS. L. TODAY 59, 59-60 (2002) (suggesting that 
electronic communications program should include:  a written policy about personal 
and professional use of e-mail and the Internet; employee education about how to 
properly use and the risks of misuse of technology; mechanisms to reduce the 
company’s liability relating to employee’s use of technology; and procedures that 
enable auditing the electronic communications program). 
 286. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 33-34 (highlighting that data deletion and the 
failure to implement an effective document retention policy may result in sanctions 
and an instruction to the jury to infer that the documents were purposefully 
deleted). 
 287. See Grady, supra note 267, at 532-33 n.50 (listing required duration of record 
retention by CFR statute title). 
 288. See Prescott, supra note 264, at B7 (noting the competing interests of IT 
personnel who perceive data storage costs as low and who focus on the form of data 
preserved and general counsels’ concern with high costs of discovery and 
unnecessary litigation liability as an aftereffect of preserving too much data). 
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ordinary course of business and to look at cost-shifting based on the 
totality of the circumstances.  State and local rules offer a sensible 
alternative and provide for the discovery of electronic information 
only if it is kept in the ordinary course of business.  Moreover, local 
rules anticipate the need to identify electronic discovery issues early 
during the pre-trial conference. 
The potential impact of Zubulake may encourage broad requests 
during electronic discovery and thus will spark much-needed 
restructuring of information systems practices and processes in order 
to avoid unnecessary risk.  Information technology departments 
across the country will therefore be required to reorganize practices 
and processes in order to reduce litigation costs.  A carefully crafted 
data management plan will ensure easy accessibility to information 
and will enable corporate counsel to better predict litigation costs to 
avoid unnecessary settlement. 
A more flexible threshold test that takes care to consider the 
equities of the case rather than the format of the file squares with the 
interests of justice.  One of the obvious challenges courts will face if 
other circuits follow the Zubulake decision will be defining 
inaccessibility.  Determining accessibility will require education and 
training of the judiciary regarding the complicated technical topic of 
accessing electronic data.289 
 
                                                          
 289. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 196, at 16-17 (suggesting education and 
training of judiciary regarding electronic discovery concepts and issues ranks as a key 
problem discovered in the study). 
